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Last Tenn:
GOOD NEWS CLUB, et al., Petitioners
V.
MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL
No. 99-2036
Decided June 11, 2001
Classrooms Open to Faith Groups
High Court Rules That Christian Clubs Can Meet in School Buildings
After Hours, Just Like Other Nonschool Groups
Chtdsian Science Monitor
Tuesday, June 12,2001
Warren Richey
An evangelical Christian group has a
right to meet after hours in public-school
classrooms despite the religious content
of the group's meetings.
So says the US Supreme Court in an
important church-state decision that may
help pave the way for Bush administration
plans to expand government partnerships
with faith-based social-service groups.
In a 6-to-3 decision Monday, the high
court ruled that if the Milford, N.Y.,
school board offers access to various
groups holding after-school meetings, the
board may not refuse the same access to
the Good News Club, an evangelical
group that targets grade-school kids,
simply because the board has deemed it
too religiously oriented.
The decision marks an important
development in the court's evolution on
church-state issues. It clarifies how
government organizations must treat
faith-based groups. Specifically, it
demonstrates what it
government to be
such groups.
means for the
neutral toward
"When Milford denied the Good News
Club access to the school's limited public
forum on the ground that the Club was
religious in nature, it discriminated against
the Club because of its religious
viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment," writes
Justice Clarence Thomas for the majority.
The court ruled that the meetings after
school amounted to a form of private
speech that is protected by the First
Amendment. The school board had
argued in part that permitting the club to
meet in school facilities would be an
unconstitutional endorsement of religion
by the school board.
But the court ruled that if the school
maintained a policy granting private
groups access to classrooms after school,
then the school board cannot deny similar
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access to one particular group because of
its religious orientation.
"The court has had a remarkably
consistent rule for 40 years on issues like
this that private religious speech, even on
public property, is protected," says
Douglas Laycock, a University of Texas
church-state scholar.
Critics see the decision as opening a door
for the increased use of public facilities to
advance religion. "The court didn't
recognize how aggressive this evangelism
is," says Barry Lynn, head of Americans
United for the Separation of Church and
State. "This is a back door to very
aggressive proselytizing by these groups."
Right to exclude?
At issue in the case - Good News Club v.
Milford Central School- was whether the
school board could exclude the club from
using a classroom for meetings
immediately after school let out. Only
students with written permission from
their parents could participate in the
meetings.
The school board denied access to the 25-
member club, citing a state law and a
school policy that prohibited the use of
school facilities for religious worship. The
board concluded that the club's activities
were the equivalent of worship services.
The club sued the school board, claiming
that it granted access to groups like the
Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, and 4-H Club
that were involved in the moral
development of young people. The club
said it shared the same goal of moral
development of youth, but approached
that goal through religious means.
A federal district judge and a divided
appeals court panel sided with the school
board. The courts ruled that rather than
merely approaching the subject of
morality from a religious perspective,
the group was engaged in actual worship.
In reversing the lower court decisions, the
US Supreme Court said the school district
had engaged in "impermissible viewpoint
discrimination."
"We disagree that something that is
quintessentially religious or decidedly
religious in nature cannot also be
characterized properly as the teaching of
morals and character development from a
particular viewpoint," Justice Thomas
writes.
Justice Thomas was joined in the majority
by Chief Justice Willliam Rehnquist, and
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin
Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Stephen
Breyer.
The dissent
Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter,
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented.
Justice Stevens, in a written dissent, draws
a distinction between speech from a
religious viewpoint and religious
proselytizing. He compares it to a
discussion of political issues used to
recmit new members to a particular
organization.
"If a school decides to authorize after-
school discussions of current events in its
classrooms, it may not exclude people
from expressing their views simply
because it dislikes their particular
political opinions," he says. "But must it
therefore allow organized political groups
- for example, the Democratic Party, the
Libertarian Party, or the Ku Klux Klan -
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to hold meetings, the principal purpose of
which is not to discuss the current-events
topic ... but rather to recruit others to join
their respective groups? I think not."
Justice Souter agreed in his own written
dissent. "It is beyond question that Good
News intends to use the public school
premises not for the mere discussion of a
subject from a particular, Christian
point of view, but for an evangelical
service of worship calling children to
commit themselves in an act of Christian
conversion," he writes.
He says the majority ignored this reality
and thus the decision must be viewed only
in broad, generic terms. "Otherwise, this
case would stand for the remarkable
proposition that any public school opened
for civic meetings must be opened for use
as a church, synagogue, or mosque."
Copyright © 2001 Christian Science
Monitor
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Last Term:
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, Petitioner
V.
COLORADO REPUBLICAN FEDERAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE, Respondent
No. 00-191
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided June 25, 2001
Court Backs Limits on Campaign Spending
justices Cite Need to Curb "Hard Money" Contibutions
The Washington Post
Tuesday, June 26, 2001
Chades Lane
The Supreme Court yesterday upheld
strict limits on how ,much political
parties can spend in coordination with
their congressional candidates, rejecting
an argument that the restrictions violated
the parties' free speech rights.
Although the 5 to 4 ruling did not involve
"soft money" -- the unlimited donations
to parties from wealthy individuals,
corporations and labor unions -- both
sides in that debate had watched it
carefully for clues to how the high court
might consider the constitutionality of
prohibiting soft money.
The majority seemed sympathetic to
arguments that large contributions to
parties could influence candidates, and
advocates of stricter campaign finance
laws said they thought the court's
approach would help them in any court
challenge to the soft money ban pending
in Congress.
Yesterday's case involved the way parties
spend "hard money" -- funds that are
raised from individuals and political action
committees in limited amounts and that,
unlike soft money, can be spent explicitly
in support of candidates. Under the
federal election law, each party can spend
a set amount of "hard money" in
coordination with its candidates, on top of
what the candidates themselves spend.
Because the GOP's congressional
campaign committees raise far more hard
money than their Democratic ounterparts,
Democrats feared a ruling permitting
parties to pump unlimited sums into
congressional races would leave them at a
marked disadvantage.
Instead, the court upheld the spending
limits. It said permitting parties to spend
unlimited amounts in coordination with
their candidates could give wealthy donors
a loophole through which they could
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evade contribution limits and exercise
improper influence over candidates.
"Despite years of enforcement of the
challenged limits," Justice David H Souter
wrote for the majority, "substantial
evidence demonstrates how candidates,
donors, and parties test the limits of the
current law, and it shows beyond serious
doubt how contribution limits would be
eroded if inducement to circumvent them
were enhanced by declaring parties'
coordinated spending wide open."
Souter's opinion was joined by Justices
Sandra Day O'Connor, Stephen G.
Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and John
Paul Stevens.
The case involved radio advertisements
run by the Colorado Republican Party in
advance of the 1986 Senate race criticizing
Tim Wirth, then a congressman and the
eventual Democratic nominee. Democrats
complained that the ads amounted to
contributions to Wirth's opponent and
put the GOP over the party spending
limit.
In a case that also went to the high court,
the justices in 1996 said spending limits
were unconstitutional when parties act
independently of their candidates. It left
open the question, decided yesterday, of
whether the limits violate parties' free
speech rights if the spending is done in
coordination with candidates, the usual
way parties operate.
Accusing the Colorado Republicans of "a
refusal to see how the power of money
actually works in the political structure,"
Souter brushed aside the party's
contention that it could not possibly
corrupt its own members.
Rejecting Colorado Republicans'
contention that parties have an especially
strong claim to freedom of association
because of the role they play in organizing
disparate political groups and uniting
them behind candidates, the court said
they should be treated no differently from
political action committees or wealthy
individuals when it comes to regulating
contributions to individual candidates.
In dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas,
joined by Chief Justice William H
Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and
Anthony M. Kennedy, called the spending
limits an attack on the parties' function in
the American political system and an
abridgement of their right to free political
expression.
"I remain baffled that this Court has
extended the most generous First
Amendment safeguards to filing lawsuits,
wearing profane jackets, and exhibiting
drive-in movies with nudity, but has
offered only tepid protection to the core
speech and associational rights that our
Founders sought to defend," Thomas
wrote.
Backers of the soft money ban proposed
by Sens. John McCain (R-Ariz.)
and Russell Feingold (D-Wis.) said they
were cheered by the ruling.
"Clearly, this decision demonstrates that
McCain-Feingold restrictions on
campaign contributions are
constitutional," McCain said in a
statement. As the House prepares to
consider the legislation next month, he
added, "Our opponents will have to find
some other excuse not to enact laws to
restore Americans' confidence in our
political system."
McCain-Feingold has passed the Senate
but opponents, led by Sen. Mitch
McConnell (R.-Ky) and such groups as
the National Right to Life Committee and
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the American Civil Liberties Union, have
pledged a court challenge if it becomes
law.
Nevertheless, the tone and logic of the
court's opinion yesterday implied the
court might uphold a soft money ban.
Yesterday, the court referred to the way in
which donors "can use parties as conduits
for contributions meant to place
candidates under obligation."
Common Cause President Scott
Harshbarger called the ruling "good news
for the future of campaign finance reform
efforts." He added, "The court today ...
has once again recognized that Congress
can act -- consistent with the First
Amendment -- to protect the integrity of
our politics by regulating big money."
Craig Engle, a former general counsel of
the National Republican Senatorial
Committee, disagreed.
"Throughout the majority opinion, it is
pretty clear that party committees cannot
be treated differently than other political
actors... ." he said. "McCain-Feingold says
we are going to hold the party
comnuttees out for special treatment, that
because of their unique
position they will be prohibited from
doing certain things that others may do. If
the court won't give parties special
permission, then it's unlikely the court will
give parties special prohibitions."
One leading McCain-Feingold opponent
said that, to the extent soft money
finances activities that are not directly
connected to particular candidates, such as
get-out-the-vote drives, yesterdays ruling
strengthens the case against an across-the
board ban.
"The high court's opinion confirms that
when parties act independently from
candidates or pursue activities that are not
contributions to candidates, they may not
constitutionally be limited, much less
subjected to an outright ban as in McCain-
Feingold," said James Bopp Jr., general
counsel of the James Madison Center for
Free Speech.
The case is Federal Election Commission
v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee, No. 00-191.
Copyright a 2001 The Washington Pct
Company
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Last Term:
LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, Petitioner
V.
Carmen VELAZQUEZ, et al.
United States
V.
Carmen Valazquez, et al.
Nos. 99-603 and 99-960
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided February 28, 2001
Tide Turning in LSC's Favor
Chicago Daily La w Bulletin
March 2, 2001
Patricia Manson
Proponents of the Legal Services Corp.
scored two victories this week in their
perennial battle for support for civil legal
services to the poor.
One of those wins came when President
Bush submitted a proposed budget calling
for Congress to hold LSCs funding steady
in the next fiscal year.
Another success was chalked up when a
narrowly divided U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that Congress trampled on
constitutional rights by barring LSC-
funded lawyers from challenging existing
welfare laws on behalf of their clients.
But while hailing those victories, LSC
proponents warned that there is still work
ahead for the nation's largest funder of
civil legal services to low- income people.
And they said the most immediate task is
to seek Congress' support for funding -- a
task that was given a boost Wednesday
when Bush called for the LSC to receive
$329 million in fiscal year 2002.
That is the amount the LSC received for
the current year after the $330 million
Congress appropriated was reduced by
$726,000 under an across-the-board cut
for 12 appropriations bills.
LSC proponents indicated they do not
expect efforts to obtain funding for 2002
to meet with the kind of partisan
opposition seen in the past when the
agency was targeted for extinction by
some conservative lawmakers.
L. Jonathan Ross, a Manchester, N.H,
attomey who heads the American Bar
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Association's Standing Committee on
Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, said
he believes Bush's proposal to fund the
LSC "represents the administration's
statement that legal services to the poor in
civil areas in this country is an important
governmental function."
"I think it shows support for what the
corporation has been doing and affirms
that this is no longer a partisan but a
bipartisan issue: to provide equal justice to
citizens of the United States and others
who need civil legal services and can't
afford them," Ross said.
The executive director of the Legal
Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan
Chicago, Sheldon Roodman, said he also
believes there is more support in
Washington for the LSC than in the
recent past.
Roodman said he expects Congress to
hammer out any disputes over the LSC
appropriation "in a spirit of good will, in
contrast to years past when some
congressmen ... tried to slash our funds by
50 percent."
Deborah H Bornstein, president of the
LAF Chicago board, said she too is
pleased that "the budget isn't being
attacked at this juncture."
"It's still below the level it was 15 years
ago. But we need every penny, and we're
glad there is some moderation being
exercised by the current administration in
declining to cut the funding," Bormstein
said.
LSC funding typicaly is included in the
appropriation bill for the Commerce,
Justice and State departments. With the
next fiscal year beginning Oct. 1,
Congress has months to work out the
details of that and other appropriation
measures.
In the current fiscal year, LAF Chicago
received about $6.4 million -- or more
than 55 percent of its $11 million budget -
- in LSC funds.
The remainder of the local group's
funding comes from state and city
governments and private donors and
foundations. Contributions may be sent to
LAF Chicago at 111 W. Jackson Blvd.,
Chicago, 60604.
Although efforts to eliminate the LSC
failed, Congress for the past several years
has battled over how much taxpayer
money-- if any-- should go to the agency.
The LSC appropriation was slashed to
$278 million in 1996, the year Republicans
took contml of Congress.
LSC came under attack in the following
years for what lawmakers called a liberal
agenda, and the LSC was subjected to
such restrictions as a bar on bringing class
actions against government entities or
engaging in legislative advocacy
Another restriction imposed on LSG
funded attorneys was a ban on challenging
state or federal welfare reform statutes or
regulations.
The prohibition was included in 1996
welfare overhaul that was championed by
the Democratic Clinton administration
and enacted by a Republican-led
Congress.
But in a 5-4 decision Wednesday, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that the prohibition
represented an unconstitutional gag order
that hampered lawyers in meeting their
responsibilities to their clients. Legal
Services Corp. v. Velazquez, No. 99-603;
and U.S. v. Velazquez, No. 99-960.
"The Velazquez decision reinforces the
notion that legal-assistance lawyers should
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be able to represent our clients using all of
the arguments and procedures available to
lawyers in private practice," Roodman
said.
Julie Clark, vice president for government
relations of the Washington-based
National Legal Aid and Defender
Association, described the Supreme
Court's ruling as "a very significant
victory."
LSC proponents said they hoped
Velazquez would prompt Congress to
reconsider some of the other limits placed
on attorneys receiving funds from the
agency.
But some expressed doubts that Congress
would reverse itself.
"I'm not sure under a Republican majority
there would be much sympathy for lifting
the restrictions," Clark said.
And Ross said Congress and the Supreme
Court "are just two different forums" that
approach the question of legal aid to the
poor from a different perspective.
Even so, Ross said, the high court's ruling
could offer guidance to legislators
considering the LSC's role in the justice
system.
"I hope that the congressional reaction is
to carefully look at the majority opinion
and not retrench from the advances that
have been made in the service and the
funding for the Legal Services Corp. over
the last few years and the strong support
that the Bush administration is giving to
that concept," he said.
Copyright © 2001 by Law Bulletin
Publishing Company
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Last Tenn:
Gloria BARTNICKI and Anthony F. Kane, Jr. Petitioners,
V.
Frederick W. VOPPER, et al.
United States, Petitioner
V.
Frederick W. Vopper, et al.
Nos. 99-1678 and 99-1728
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided May21, 2001
We Could Be Heroes
The Ylage Voice
Tuesday, June 12, 2001
Cynthia Cotts
In a decision issued May 21, The
Supreme Court elevated the First
Amendment over privacy rights, by
protecting a radio talk-show host who
had broadcast an illegal tape. The
decision, Bartnicki v. Vopper,
seemed to give the press what it
wanted: immunity to publish
accurate, newsworthy information
even when it came from a source who
broke the law to get it.
But while the vote was 6-3, Justice John
Paul Stevens's opinion was so murky that
some experts say it's only a matter of time
before the Supremes go the other way,
giving privacy claims the power to censor
the press. And if that happens, some fear
the government will steal the rhetoric,
making it a crime for the media to publish
anything the feds choose to classify as a
secret.
On the face of it Bannicki is an important
victory for the press. According to
attomey Theodore J. Boutrous Jr., who
filed an arnicus brief on behalf of The
Wall Street Joumal, the decision gives
journalists "a strong argument that if they
have lawfully obtained information and
it's truthful and of public concern, they
cannot be punished."
Says Ken Paulson, executive director of
the First Amendment Center, "There's
nothing here that suggests that any news
organization needs to do anything
different." As before, the legality of
publishing stolen goods is not
automatically guaranteed, and journalists
can still be punished if they break a law or
encourage a source to do so.
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But the Bartnicki decision leaves a lot of
loopholes, and some describe it as
equivocal. "It's a strange opinion," said
one lawyer with a stake in the case. "It's
kind of hiding the ball. I think
they're concerned about the privacy
interests, and they want to be able to limit
or narrow this later on. That's why they
don't show you all their cards." This
source finds it conspicuous that Stevens
did not state his standard for review, as is
customary when crafting constitutional
law. The source guesses that the omission
was insisted on by Stephen Breyer and
Sandra Day O'Connor, who voted
with the majority but voiced reservations
m a concurnng opinion.
The facts of Bartnicki are not all that
compelling. A few years ago, someone
illegally taped a conversation between two
representatives of a teachers' union in
Pennsylvania. The union reps were
negotiating with the local school board,
and they'd hit a snag. One rep told the
other that if the school board didn't come
around, "We're gonna have to go to their
homes ... to blow off their front
porches." Before long, the tape was
broadcast by talk-show host Frederick
Vopper, who ended up getting sued.
What's the big deal if some union guy has
a violent fantasy, someone else gets him
on tape, and a third guy broadcasts it for
town comment? In principle, this case is
about leaks, those unexpected gifts that
journalists depend on to help expose
public and private corruption. The most
notorious leak of all was the
Pentagon Papers, a secret study of the
Vietnam War that Daniel Ellsberg leaked
to The New York Times. In 1971, the
Supreme Court gave the Ames immunity
to publish it, a decision journalists have
relied on ever since when publishing info
obtained by a third party illegally.
Under the U.S. legal system, some nobody
can become a cause celebre for an entire
class of potential defendants. That's why,
on the way to Capitol Hill, Vopper
attracted the support of The New York
Times, The Washington Post, and the
Journal, as well as magazines, TV
networks, and wire services, all of whom
joined amicus briefs on his behalf. The
collective.wish was that upon reviewing
Vopper s case, the Supremes would issue
a broad rule, granting the press blanket
immunity to publish anything as long as
it's true and newsworthy-whether or not
criminal behavior is involved.
Publishers aren't the only ones who think
they deserve protection when their
sources are thieves and eavesdroppers: In
1975, constitutional scholar Alexander
Bickel argued that the press should
not be held responsible for judging the
morality of its sources. But that was post-
Watergate, when Americans wanted a
more transparent government and a more
powerful press. At the same time, privacy
was finding a niche in U.S. social policy,
helping protect gay lifestyles and abortion
rights. In the last 25 years, "the public
has gradually turned its back on [the press]
in favor of privacy," says Paulson. "We
don't have the fever we had in the wake of
Watergate."
And so, instead of seizing Bartnicki as a
chance to be media heroes, the Supremes
issued a series of conflicting messages:
Stevens's majority opinion, the Breyer and
O'Connor concurrence, and an ominous
dissent signed by William Rehnquist,
Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas.
Experts suggest that Breyer and
O'Connor didn't want to endorse a
hard-and-fast rule because it might serve
to justify using a high-tech bug to record
someone's pillow talk. "Sooner or later
there will be a case that shocks the
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conscience," says Paulson, who
offers the following hypothetical: In a
political campaign, the upstart uses
listening devices to pick up the
incumbent's private conversations in his
car or his bedroom, finds some
newsworthy dirt, and sends the tape
anonymously to the local newspaper.
While it's arguable that the media could
publish the content of that tape
without fear of penalty, Paulson says that,
post-Bartnicki, some news companies
might get scared and decide that in all
cases, "we won't take anything that's the
fruit of the poisonous tree."
And if Breyer's Bartnicki concurrence
doesn't have a chilling effect on the press,
consider Rehnquist's dissent, which argues
that the right to privacy should trump the
First Amendment no matter what. Gregg
Leslie, legal defense director for the
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press, calls the dissent a Trojan horse,
noting that if the dissenters had prevailed,
giving individuals the power to suppress
free speech, "it would open the
floodgates for the government to justify
its actions because it was trying to protect
people's privacy." Under that rationale,
privacy would be "not just a shield for
individuals, but a sword the government
can use to overcome someone's First
Amendment rights."
Here's how that might pan out: Last fall,
Congress approved a law that would have
made it a felony for government officials
to disclose any information that was
deemed classified. The New York
Times editorialized that such a bill could
be used to "shield misconduct, block
access to historical papers," and "deny
Americans the chance to debate critical
national issues." To his credit,
Clinton vetoed the bill. But under Bush,
one can imagine renewed support for
keeping all government documents under
wraps. If a test case makes it to the
Supreme Court, Breyer and O'Connor
might join the Bartnicki dissenters,
resulting in a block of five justices who
believe that privacy rights can overpower
the press.
"The irony is that the right of privacy was
supposed to protect an individual against
the government," says Leslie. "It was
never supposed to be something that gave
the government more power."
Copyright D 2001 Bell & Howell
Information and Learning Company. All
rights reserved. Copyright * 2001 Village
Voice
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Last Term:
LORILLARD TOBACCO CO., et al. Petitioners
V.
Thomas F. REILLY
Altadis U.S.A. Inc., et al., Petitioners
V.
Thomas F. Reilly, et al.
Nos. 00-596 and 00-597
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided June 28, 2001
Court: State Can't Limit Tobacco Ads
The Associated Press
Thursday, June 28, 2001
Anne Gearan
State efforts to ban tobacco advertising
near playgrounds and schools violate
both federal law and free-speech rights,
the Supreme Court ruled Thursday,
concluding its 2000-2001 term with a
victory for tobacco companies.
On the first and most practical point, the
court ruled that states may not add their
own advertising restrictions to the federal
law that bans cigarette ads on TV and
requires warning labels on packages.
That finding, by a vote of 5-4, would have
been enough to defeat a proposed
tobacco ad ban in Massachusetts.
But the court went on to rule that the
state's plan would violate the First
Amendment guarantee of free speech,
because in the course of limiting children's
exposure to tobacco ads, the state would
prevent adults from seeing information
about a product they have the legal right
to buy.
The court focused first on the scope and
wording of the 1969 national law passed
by Congress to limit the way cigarettes are
marketed and to increase public awareness
of the dangers of tobacco.
The cigarette companies claimed that the
national ad law trumped state efforts to
pile on their own restrictions, and the
Supreme Court agreed.
"From a policy perspective, it is
understandable for the states to attempt to
prevent minors from using tobacco
products before they reach an age where
they are capable of weighing for
themselves the risks and potential benefits
of tobacco use, and other adult activities,"
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Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote for
the court.
"Federal law, however, places limits on
policy choices available to the states."
That reasoning apparently also invalidates
similar local ad bans in New York City,
Chicago and Baltimore, said Richard
Daynard, president of the Tobacco
Control Resource Center in Boston.
States would still be free to try other
means to limit children's smoking, such as
raising the legal age to buy tobacco, and
increasing the price of cigarettes, Daynard
said.
The Massachusetts regulations would have
gone farther than the 1969 law, and
farther than the 1998 settlement between
tobacco companies and states that
stopped billboard advertising and signs in
places such as sports stadiums.
The plan has been on hold while the
tobacco companies fought it in court.
Massachusetts Attorney General Tom
Reilly said he will ask Congress to change
the 1969 federal law.
"It's about time Congress stepped up and
took on the tobacco companies," Reilly
said.
Tobacco opponents also noted that the
same court majority threw out a Clinton
administration anti-smoking initiative last
year, ruling that the government does not
have the authority to regulate tobacco as
an addictive drug.
The Campaign for Tobacco-free Kids said
the Massachusetts plan was a
commonsense attempt to keep tobacco
away from those too young to buy it.
"No responsible corporate citizen would
defend its right to market a deadly and
addictive product near schools and
playgrounds," said the group's president,
Matthew L. Myers.
The court upheld one part of the
Massachusetts plan. The state may ban
self-service displays of cigarette cartons or
other tobacco products in stores, and may
require that the products be kept behind
the counter or otherwise out of children's
easy reach, the court ruled.
O'Connor also wrote that states and cities
retain the right to apply various zoning
restrictions to cigarettes, so long as
tobacco is "on equal terms with other
products."
Tobacco firms said Thursday the ruling
was a relief but will not have much effect
on the way they sell their products.
"We've already done a lot of things to
change the way cigarettes are marketed or
advertised," said William S. Olilemeyer,
vice president and general counsel of
Philip Morris. "This decision (does not
mean) an effort to advertise more broadly
or aggressively than we do now."
Although large portions of Thursday's
lengthy opinion were unanimous, the
court divided 5-4 along ideological lines
on the two most crucial points. The
conservative-led voting bloc prevailed in
both instances.
The case afforded the court an
opportunity to grant "commercial speech"
such as advertising the same free-speech
rights as political or artistic expression.
But the court's overlapping statements on
the First Amendment portion of the
tobacco case are too tangled to be the
broad new pronouncement on
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commercial speech that Justice Clarence
Thomas and conservatives outside the
court had hoped.
"I have observed previously that there is
no philosophical or historical basis for
asserting that commercial speech is of
lower value that noncommercial speech,"
Thomas wrote in a separate concurring
opinion.
Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G.
Breyer and David Souter would have
ordered a trial in lower court to settle the
constitutionality of the proposed outdoor
advertising ban.
The four dissenters would have upheld
the constitutionality of ad restrictions
inside convenience stores, gas stations and
other places where people buy tobacco.
The cases are Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly,
00-596, and Altadis U.S.A
v. Reilly, 00-597.
Copyright 0 2001 The Associated Press
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00-795 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition
Ruling Below (9' Cir., 198 F.3d 1083, 68 U.S.L.W. 1381, 66 Crim. L. Rep. 237, 28 Media L.
Rep. 1225):
Child PornographyPrevention Act of 1996, which prohibits "visual depiction" that "appears
to be" or "conveys the impression" of minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, is
content-based restriction on speech that is unsupported by any compelling governmental
interest and thus violates First Amendment.
Question Presented: Is First Amendment violated by Child Pornography Prevention Act's
prohibition of shipment, distribution, receipt, reproduction sale, or possession of any visual
depiction that "appears to be [] of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct," 18 U.S.C§§2252A and 2256(8)(B), and by act's prohibition of anyvisual depiction that is "advertised,
promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression
that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct," §§2252A and 2256(8)(D)?
FREE SPEECH COALITION, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants
V.
Janet RENO, Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, Defendants-
Appellees
United States Court of Appeals
for the Nnth Circuit
Decided March 10, 1998
MOLLOY, District Judge:
I.
The question presented in this case is
whether Congress may constitutionally
proscribe as child pornography
computer images that do not involve the
use of real children in their production
or dissemination. We hold that the First
Amendment prohibits Congress from
enacting a statute that makes criminal the
generation of images of fictitious
children engaged in imaginary but
explicit sexual conduct.
II.
In this case, the district court found that
the Child Pornography Prevention Act
of 1996 ("CPPA" or the "Act") was
content-neutral, was not
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad,
and did not constitute an improper prior
restraint of speech. The district court
also found that the Child Pornography
Prevention Act's affirmative defense did
not impermissibly shift the burden of
proof to a defendant by virtue of an
unconstitutional presumption.
While we agree that the plaintiffs have
standing to bring this case and that theAct is not an improper prior restraint of
speech, the balance of the district court's
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analysis does not comport with what we
believe is required by the Constitution.
We find that the phrases "appears to be"
a minor, and "convey[s] the impression"
that the depiction portrays a minor, are
vague and overbroad and thus do not
meet the requirements of the First
Amendment. Consequently we hold that
while these two provisions of the Act do
not pass constitutional muster, the
balance of the Child Pornography
Prevention Act is constitutional when
the two phrases are stricken. Whether
the statutory affirmative defense is
constitutional is a question that we leave
for resolution in a different case.
A.
The appellants consist of a group that
refers to itself as "The Free Speech
Coalition." The Free Speech Coalition is
a trade association of businesses
involved in the production and
distribution of "adult-oriented materials."
Bold Type, Inc. is a publisher of a book
"dedicated to the education and
expression of the ideals and philosophy
associated with nudism;" Jim Gingerich
is a New York artist whose paintings
include large-scale nudes; and Ron
Raffaelli is a professional photographer
whose works include nude and erotic
photographs.
* * 'The district court determined the
CPPA was constitutional and granted the
government's motion for summary
judgment. See 7he Fr Spixh Onlition v
Ren, No. C 97-0281 VSC, 1997 WL
487758, at *7 (N.D.Cal. Aug.12, 1997).5
At the same time it denied Free Speech's
cross motion for summary judgment. Sw
5 The Opinion of the district court is not
published in the Federal Supplement.
id After the district court's adverse
ruling, Free Speech appealed.
In this appeal, Free Speech argues the
district court was mistaken in its
determination that the legislation is
content neutral. They also argue that the
district court was wrong to hold that the
Act is not unconstitutionally vague. The
argument is that where the statute fails to
define "appears to be" and "conveys the
impression," it is so vague a person of
ordinary intelligence cannot understand
what is prohibited. Free Speech also
questions the district court's holding that
the affirmative defense provided in the
Act is constitutional. Finally, Free
Speech appeals the lower court's
determination that the Act does not
impose a prior restraint on protected
speech and that it does not create a
permanent chill on protected expression.
B.
Child pornography is a social concern
that has evaded repeated attempts to
stamp it out. State legislatures and
Congress have vigorously tried to
investigate and enact laws to provide a
basis to prosecute those persons
involved in the creation, distribution, and
possession of sexually explicit materials
made by or through the exploitation of
children. Our concern is with the most
recent federal law enacted as part of the
effort to rid society of the exploitation of
children for sexual gratification, the
Child Pornography Prevention Act of
1996.
6.
The Child Pornography Prevention Act
of 1996 expanded the law to combat the
use of computer technology to produce
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pornography containing images that look
like children. The new law sought to
stifle the use of technology for evil
purposes. This of course was a marked
change in the criminal regulatory
scheme. Congress had always acted to
prevent harm to real children. In the new
law, Congress shifted the paradigm from
the illegality of child pornography that
involved the use of real children in its
creation to forbid a "visual depiction"
that "is, or appears to be, of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct."
See 18 U.S.CA. 5 2256(8)(B) (West
Supp.1999).
The premise behind the Child
Pornography Prevention Act is the
asserted impact of such images on the
children who may view them. The law is
also based on the notion that child
pornography, real as well as virtual,
increases the activities of child molesters
and pedophiles.
7.
18 U.S.C § 2256(8)6 defines child
pornography as "any visual depiction,
including any photograph, film, video,
picture, or computer or computer-
generated image or picture, whether
made or produced by electronic,
mechanical, or other means, of sexually
6 18 U.S.C. §2256(8) defines child pornography
as: [A]ny visual depiction, including any
photograph, film, picture, or computer-generated
image or picture, whether made or produced by
electronic, mechanical, or other means, of
sexually explicit conduct, where-
(A) the production of such visual depiction
involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct;
(B) bestiality;
(C) masturbation;
(D) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or
(E) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic
area of any person.
18 U.S.C.A. §2256(2) (West Supp. 1999).
explicit conduct.]"7 At issue in this
appeal are the definitions contained in
subsections (B) and (D) of 5 2256(8).
Section 2256(8)(B) bans sexually explicit
depictions that appear to be minors.
Section 2256(8)(D) bans visual
depictions that are "advertised,
promoted, presented, described or
distributed in such a manner that
conveys the impression" that they
contain sexually explicit depictions of
minors.
Because we hold the language at issue is
unconstitutional, we do not consider the
challenge to the affirmative defense in 18
U.S.C S 2252A(c).8
1.
The district court held that the contested
provisions of the Child Pornography
Prevention Act are content-neutral
regulations. * * *
7 "Sexually explicit conduct" means: actual or
simulated-
(A) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital,
oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether
between persons of the same or opposite sex;
(B) bestiality
(C) masturbation;
(D) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or
(E) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic
area of any person.
18 U.S.C.A. §2256(2) (West Supp. 1999).
8 The CPPA, 18 U.S.C. §2252A(c), provides an
affirmative defense for violations of the Act if:
(1) the alleged child pornography was produced
using an actual person or persons engaging in
sexually explicit conduct
(2) each such person was an adult at the time the
material was produced; and
(3) the defendant did not advertise, promote,
present, describe, or distribute the material in
such a manner as to convey the impression that it
is or contains a visual depiction of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
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We do not agree. In Unita State u
Hiton, 167 F.3d 61, 68-69 (1st Cir.1999),
arde bie --- U.S. -----, 120 S.Ct. 115, 145
L.Ed.2d 98 (1999), the First Circuit
found that the Act at issue was content-
based because it expressly aims to curb a
particular category of expression, child
pornography, by singling out the type of
expression based on its content and then
banning it. The Hilton court's
determination that blanket suppression
of an entire type of speech is a content-
discriminating act is a legal conclusion
with which we agree. The child
pornography law is at its essence
founded upon content-based
classification of speech.
The CPPA prohibits any sexually explicit
depiction that "appears to be" of a minor
or that is distributed or advertised in
such a manner as to "convey the
impression" that the depiction portrays a
minor. Thus, the CPPA distinguishes
favored from disfavored speech on the
basis of the content of that speech. See
CraV6t( 96 F.3d at 384.
When a statute restricts speech by its
content, it is presumptively
unconstitutional. Se Craz;ft( 96 F.3d at
385. As the First Circuit determined in
Hiltar
The CPPA fails both tests for
substantive neutrality it expressly
aims to curb a particular category
of expression (child
pornography) by singling out that
type of expression based on its
content and banning it. Blanket
suppression of an entire type of
speech is by its very nature a
content- discriminating act.
Furthermore, Congress has not
kept secret that one of its
motivating reasons for enacting
the CPPA was to counter the
primary effect child pornography
has on those who view it.
167 F.3d at 68-69 (footnote omitted).
The CPPA is not a time, place, or
manner regulation.
2.
Under the circumstances, if the CPPA is
to survive the constitutional inquiry the
government must establish a compelling
interest that is served by the statute, and
it must show that the CPPA is narrowly
tailored to fulfill that interest. See
Craorybt 96 F.3d at 385-86.
The district court found that even if no
children are involved in the production
of such materials the devastating
secondary effect that sexually explicit
materials involving the images of
children have on society, and on the well
being of children, merits the regulation
of such images. * * We believe this legal
determination is wrong.
There are three compelling interests put
forward when instituting efforts to curb
child pornography using images of actual
children. The first interest is that child
pornography requires the participation of
actual children in sexually explicit
situations to create the images. The
second interest stems from the belief
that dissemination of such pornographic
images may encourage more sexual
abuse of children because it whets the
appetite of pedophiles. The third
interest is that such images are morally
and aesthetically repugnant.
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The language of the statute questioned
here can criminalize the use of fictional
images that involve no human being,
whether that fictional person is over the
statutory age and looks younger, or
indeed, a fictional person under the
prohibited age. Images that are, or can
be, entirely the product of the mind are
criminalized. The CPPA's definition of
child pornography extends to drawings
or images that "appear" to be minors or
visual depictions that "convey' the
impression that a minor is engaging in
sexually explicit conduct, whether an
actual minor is involved or not. The
constitutionality of this definition is not
supported by existing case law.
By the same token, any victimization of
children that may arise from pedophiles'
sexual responses to pornography
apparently depicting children engaging in
explicit sexual activity is not a sufficiently
compelling justification for CPPA's
speech restrictions. This is so because to
hold otherwise enables the
criminalization of foul figments of
creative technology that do not involve
any human victim in their creation or in
their presentation. Cf JacAon v Unital
States, 503 U.S. 540, 548-49, 112 S.Ct.
1535, 118 L.Ed.2d 174 (1992)
(invalidating a federal child pornography
conviction and holding that even the
compelling interest in protecting children
from sexual exploitation does not justify
modifications in otherwise applicable
rules of criminal procedure); UnitaiState
v X-Citent Vida In, 513 U.S. 64, 78,
115 S.Ct. 464, 130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994)
(interpreting 18 U.S.C § 2252 to require
the prosecution to prove the defendant
knew the material was produced with the
use of a minor, in part because to find
otherwise would be constitutionally
problematic).
By criminalizing all visual depictions that
"appear to be" or "convey the
impression" of child pornography, even
where no child is ever used or harmed in
its production, Congress has outlawed
the type of depictions explicitly
protected by the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the First Amendment.
Because the 1996 Act attempts to
criminalize disavowed impulses of the
mind, manifested in illicit creative acts,
we determine that censorship through
the enactment of criminal laws intended
to control an evil idea cannot satisfy the
constitutional requirements of the First
Amendment.
Our determination is not to suggest that
anyone condones the implicit or explicit
harmful secondary effects of child
pornography. Rather it is a determination
to measure the statute by First
Amendment standards articulated by the
Supreme Court. To accept the secondary
effects argument as the gauge against
which the statute must be measured
requires a remarkable shift in the First
Amendment paradigm. Such a
transformation, how speech impacts the
listener or viewer, would turn First
Amendment jurisprudence on its head.
In short, we find the articulated
compelling state interest cannot justify
the criminal proscription when no actual
children are involved in the illicit images
either by production or depiction.
Because we find that Congress has not
provided a compelling interest, we do
not address the "narrow tailoring,
requirement.
3.
The district court found the CPPA is not
unconstitutionally vague as it gives
sufficient guidance to a person of
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reasonable intelligence as to what it
prohibits. Se The Fie Speah Gditian
1997 WL 487758, at '*6. The Hilton court
scrutinized the statute with a "skeptical
eye" because the new law impinges on
freedom of expression. Sce 167 F.3d at
75. In doing so, it concluded, as the
district court did here, that the CPPA
was not unconstitutionally vague. See id
at 76-77. In making its determination the
First Circuit applied an objective
standard to determine the meaning of
the phrase, "appears to be a minor." See
id at 75.
The CPPA's criminalizing of material
that "appears to be a minor" and
"convey[s] the impression" that the
material is a minor engaged in explicit
sexual activity, is void for vagueness. It
does not "give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to
know what is prohibited," and it fails to
provide explicit standards for those who
must apply it, "with the attendant
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
application." Grayrad v City Rookfomt
408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33
L.Ed.2d 222 (1972).
The two phrases in question are highly
subjective. There is no explicit standard
as to what the phrases mean. The
phrases provide no measure to guide an
ordinarily intelligent person about
prohibited conduct and any such person
could not be reasonably certain about
whose perspective defines the
appearance of a minor, or whose
impression that a minor is involved leads
to criminal prosecution.
In the same light, the absence of
definitions for these key phrases in the
CPPA allows law enforcement officials
to exercise their discretion, subjectively,
about what "appears to be" or what
"conveys the impression" of prohibited
material. Thus, the vagueness of the
statute's key phrases regarding computer
images permits enforcement in an
arbitrary and discriminatory fashion. **
4.
The district court held that the CPPA is
not overbroad because it prohibits only
those works necessary to prevent the
secondary pernicious effects of child
pornography from reaching minors. See
T1x Fne Speh Calitia 1997 WL
487758, at *6. In addition, the First
Circuit reasoned that "a few possibly
impermissible applications of the Act
does not warrant its condemnation[]"
and found that "[w~hatever overbreadth
may exist at the edges are more
appropriately cured through a more
precise case-by-case evaluation of the
facts in a given case." Hita? 167 F.3d at
74. We do not agree.
Although overbreadth must "be
'substantial' before the statute involved
will be invalidated on its face[,]" Feder,
458 U.S. at 769, 102 S.Ct. 3348, such
overbreadth is present here. On its face,
the CPPA prohibits material that has
been accorded First Amendment
protection. That is, non- obscene sexual
expression that does not involve actual
children is protected expression under
the First Amendment. See id at 764-65,
102 S.Ct. 3348. This rule abides even
when the subject matter is distasteful.
As explained, the CPPA is insufficiently
related to the interest in prohibiting
pornography actually involving minors
to justify its infringement of protected
speech. See Village /Sdiwig v Citizes
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for a Better En/v, 444 U.S. 620, 637-39,
100 S.Ct. 826, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980). *
The CPPA's inclusion of constitutionally
protected activity as well as legitimately
prohibited activity makes it overbroad.
Sw Bradride v Celahon4 413 U.S. 601,
612, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830
(1973) * * *
5.
The district court found that because the
CPPA does not require advance approval
for production or distribution of adult
pornography that does not use minors
and does not effect a complete ban on
constitutionally protected material, it
does not constitute an improper prior
restraint on speech. See The Fre Spexh
Caditie 1997 WL 487758, at *7. We
agree.
* * *The CPPA only penalizes speech
after it occurs. As such it is not a prior
restraint of speech. See id at 553-54, 113
S.Ct. 2766. The possibility of self-
censorship and the contention that the
CPPA has a chilling effect do not
amount to a prior restraint. See Fort
Waye Boes, In v Indiana, 489 U.S. 46,60, 109 S.Ct. 916, 103 L.Ed.2d 34 (1989).
V.
We hold that the language of "appears to
be a minor" set forth in 18 U.S.C 5
2256(8)(B) and the language "convey[s]
the impression" set forth in 18 U.S.C 5
2256(8)(D) are unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad. The statute is severable.
Se Pub.L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, §
101 (1996). The law is enforceable,
except for these amendments to 18
U.S.C 5 2256, § 4 of Senate Bill 1237,
through the free standing savings
provisions of 5 9, codified at 18 U.S.C .
2256(9). ** *
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED on the questions of
standing and prior restraint. The
judgment of the district court is
REVERSED on the questions of the
constitutionality of the statutory
language "appears to be a minor" and
"convey)s] the impression."
The pending motion by Stop Prisoner
Rape, to file an anicus brief in this case,
is denied.
The case is remanded to the district
court with instructions to enter judgment
on behalf of the plaintiffs consistent with
this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED
AND REMANDED IN PART.
FERGUSON, Circuit Judge, Dissenting:
The majority holds that Congress cannot
regulate virtual child pornography * * *
because it does not require the use of
actual children in its production. * * *
Without the use of actual children, the
majority believes that Congress is simply
attempting to regulate "evil ideals]." * * *
I disagree. Congress has provided
compelling evidence that virtual child
pornography causes real harm to real
children. As a result, virtual child
pornography should join the ranks of
real child pornography as a class of
speech outside the protection of the
First Amendment. In addition, I do not
believe that the statutory terms "appears
to be" or "conveys the impression" are
substantially overbroad or void for
vagueness. Accordingly, I would find the
Child Pornography Prevention Act of1996 ("CPPA") constitutional.
I.
For more than two decades, Congresshas been trying to eliminate the scourge
of child pornography. * * * Each time
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Congress passes a law, child
pornographers find a way around the
law's prohibitions. Se S.Rep. No. 104-
358, at 26 (statement of Sen. Grassley).
This cycle recently repeated itself and
prompted Congress to enact the CPPA.
Despite these detailed legislative
findings, the majority rules that Congress
failed to articulate a "compelling state
interest" to justify criminalizing virtual
child pornography. * ** The majority
argues that Congress cannot
constitutionally regulate virtual child
pornography because it does not depict
"actual children." * * * Once "actual
children" are eliminated from the
equation, the majority believes that
Congress is impermissibly trying to
regulate "evil idea[s]." *** I disagree for
the following reasons.
Finst The majority improperly suggests
that preventing harm to depicted
children is the only legitimate
justification for banning child
pornography. Although this was the
Supreme Court's focus in New Yode v
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73
L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982), the Court has
subsequently indicated a willingness to
consider additional factors. Sw aborre v
Obiq 495 U.S. 103, 110-11, 110 S.Ct.
1691, 109 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990). In alorre;
the Supreme Court addressed the issue
of whether Ohio could ban the
possession of child pornography. Id at
108, 110 S.Ct. 1691. In finding it could,
the Court relied not only on the harm
caused to the children who are used in its
production (i.e., Feder), but also on the
harm that children suffer when child
pornography is used to seduce or coerce
them into sexual activity. Id at 111, 110
S.Ct. 1691. Thus, in Clorre, the Court
indicated that protecting children who
are not actually pictured in the
pornographic image is a legitimate and
compelling state interest. See Id See also
Unit&l State u Hiltcr 167 F.3d 61, 70
(1st Cir.) (recognizing the Supreme
Court's "subtle, yet crucial, extension" of
valid state interests to include protecting
children not actually depicted), at deaied
--- U.S. ----- , 120 S.Ct. 115, 145 L.Ed.2d
98(1999).
Semii The majority ignores the fact that
the Supreme Court has already endorsed
many of the justifications Congress relied
on when it passed the CPPA. As
discussed above, the Court in aborr
recognized that states have a legitimate
interest in preventing pedophiles from
"us[ing] child pornography to seduce
other children into sexual activity."
alorrz 495 US. at 111, 110 S.Ct. 1691.
Relying on this justification, Congress
enacted the CPPA after finding that
"child pornography is often used as part
of a method of seducing other children
into sexual activity; a child who is
reluctant to engage in sexual activity with
an adult, or to pose for sexually explicit
photographs, can sometimes be
convinced by viewing depictions of other
children 'having fun' participating in such
activity." Omgnssial Fi'almgs, at 3. More
importantly, Congress found that when
child pornography is "used as a means of
seducing or breaking down a child's
inhibitions," the images are equally as
effective regardless of whether they are
real photographs or computer-generated
pictures that are "virtually
indistinguishable." Congnsi al Firim,
at 8. * * *
The Supreme Court has also recognized
that states have a legitimate interest in
destroying the child pornography
market. aborre, 495 U.S. at 110.
Similarly, in enacting the CPPA,
Congress declared that the statute would
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encourage people to destroy all forms of
child pornography, thereby reducing the
market for the material. Cotngssional
Findig at 12. At the hearing before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, witnesses
testified that persons who trade and sell
images that are indistinguishable from
those of actual children engaged in
sexual activity "keep the market for child
pornography thriving." Senate Hear*n at
91 (testimony of Bruce Taylor). * * *
This is because pictures that lad" like
children engaging in sexual activities can
be exchanged for pictures that ame of
actual children engaging in such
activities. By limiting the production and
distribution of images that appear to be
of children having sex, the CPPA helps
rid the market of all child pornography. *
**
Thini Even though Congress presented
some new justifications that the Supreme
Court has not specifically endorsed, the
majority still had an obligation to
consider them, especially if they advance
the goal of protecting children. In both
Feder and &orr, the Court stated that
"[ijt is evident beyond the need for
elaboration that a State's interest in
'safeguarding the physical and
psychological well-being of a minor' is
'compelling.' " thrr, 495 U.S. at 109,
110 S.Ct. 1691, quoting Fere, 458 U.S.
at 756-57, 102 S.Ct. 3348. "A democratic
society rests, for its continuance, upon
the healthy, well-rounded growth of
young people into full maturity as
citizens." Feder, 458 U.S. at 757, 102
S.Cr. 3348. Thus, the Court will generally
"sustain[ ] legislation aimed at protecting
the physical and emotional well- being of
children even when the laws ... operate[ ]
in sensitive areas." Id
The lesson from Fedber and bemre is
that legislators should be given "greater
leeway" when acting to protect the well-
being of children. See Id at 756, 102 S.Ct.
3348. The majority, however, ignores
this principle and fails to consider any of
the new justifications supporting the
CPPA. * * *
Fwth. The majority ignores the fact that
child pornography, real or virtual, has
little or no social value. See Feder 458
U.S. at 762, 102 S.Ct. 3348 (stating that
the value of child pornography is
"exceedingly modest, if not de minimis").
It is well established that "[tlhe
protection given to speech and press was
fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for bringing about
the political and social changes desired
by people." Roch v UnitalStads, 354 U.S.
476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498
(1957). "All ideas having even the
slightest redeeming social importance--
unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas,
even ideas hateful to the prevailing
climate of opinion-- have ... full
protection ..." Id The First Amendment,
however, does not protect certain limited
categories of speech that are "utterly
without redeeming social importance."
Id See also R.A.V. v City cf St. Paul 505
U.S. 377, 382-83, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120
L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (stating that "[f]rom
1791 to present ... our society, like other
free but civilized societies, has permitted
restrictions upon the content of speech
in a few limited areas"). These categories
include obscenity, Rath, 354 U.S. at 483,
77 S.Ct. 1304, libel, Beauharnais v Ilinus,
343 U.S. 250, 266, 72 S.Ct. 725, 96 L.Ed.
919 (1952), and "fighting words."
CIeplirky v New Hanpshin, 315 U.S.
568, 571-73, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031
(1942). Child pornography is also one of
these categories of speech. Ferber, 458
U.S. at 763-64, 102 S.Ct. 3348.
Why should virtual child pornography be
treated differently than real child
pomography? Is it more valued speech? I
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do not think so. Both real and virtual
child pornography contain visual
depictions of children engaging in
sexually explicit activity. The only
difference is that real child pornography
uses actual children in its production,
whereas virtual child pornography does
not. While this distinction is noteworthy,
it does not somehow transform virtual
child pornography into meaningful
speech. Virtual child pornography, like
its counterpart real child pornography, is
of "slight social value" and constitutes
"no essential part of the exposition of
ideas." See COhplirk 315 U.S. at 572, 62
S.Ct. 766. Therefore, the majority is
wrong to accord virtual child
pornography the full protection of the
First Amendment.
Fif. The majority improperly analyzes
the CPPA under a strict scrutiny
approach. * * *
* * *The majority should have weighed
Congress' reasons for banning virtual
child pornography against the limited
value of such material. * * * If the
majority had, it would have realized that
Congress' interests in destroying the
child pornography market and in
preventing the seduction of minors
outweigh virtual child pornography's
exceedingly modest social value. Since
the balance of competing interests tips in
favor of the government, virtual child
pornography should join the ranks of
real child pomography as a class of
speech outside the protection of the
First Amendment.
II.
The analysis does not end with a finding
that virtual child pornography is without
First Amendment protection. Statutes
can be found unconstitutional if they are
worded so broadly that they "criminalize
an intolerable range of constitutionally
protected conduct." thonm 495 U.S. at
112, 110 S.Ct. 1691. This case focuses on
the CPPA's new definition of child
pornography which prohibits visual
depictions that "appearf ] to be," or are
promoted or distributed "in such a
manner that conveys the impression,"
that they are "of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct." 18 U.S.C.AP %
2256(8)(B), (D) (West Supp.1999). The
majority holds that this language is
overbroad because it bans "material that
has been accorded First Amendment
protection." Majority Op. at 1095-96. I
disagree.
As a general rule, statutes should not be
invalidated as overbroad unless the
overbreadth is "substantial ... in relation
to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."
Bmzdik u OkLehonu, 413 U.S. 601, 615,
93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973).
The Court has cautioned that the
overbreadth doctrine is "strong
medicine" that should be employed
"sparingly and only as a last resort." Id at
613, 93 S.Ct. 2908. Accordingly, a statute
should not be invalidated as overbroad
"when a limiting construction has been
or could be placed on the challenged
statute." Id
** *
From reading the legislative history, it
becomes clear that the CPPA merely
extends the existing prohibitions on
"real" child pornography to a narrow
class of computer-generated pictures
easily mistaken for real photographs of
real children. See Conssiazal Firdis, at
13. Therefore, I agree with the United
States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit which found that "drawings,
cartoons, sculptures, and paintings
depicting youthful persons in sexually
explicit poses plainly lie beyond the Act."
Hito, 167 F.3d at 72. "By definition,
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they would not be 'virtually
indistinguishable' from an image of an
actual minor." Id "The CPPA therefore
does not pose a threat to the vast
majority of every day artistic expression,
even to speech involving sexual themes."
Id
There has also been concern that the
CPPA prohibits constitutionally
protected photographic images of adults
in sexually explicit poses. This
contention, however, is also without
merit. The CPPA explicitly states that
"[ilt shall be an affirmative defense" to a
charge of distributing, reproducing or
selling child pornography that the
pornography (1) "was produced using an
actual person or persons," (2) each of
whom "was an adult at the time the
material was produced," and (3) "the
defendant did not advertise, promote,
present, describe, or distribute the
material in such a manner as to convey
the impression that it is or contains
visual depictions of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct." 18 US.CA §
2252A(c) (West Supp.1999). The CPPA
thus shields from prosecution sexually
explicit visual depictions so long as they
are produced using actual adults and "the
material has not been pandered as child
pornography." S.Rep. No. 104-358, at
10, 21. Persons-- like the appellants in
this case--who produce and distribute
works depicting the sexual conduct of
actual adults, and do not market the
depictions as if they contain sexual
images of children, are thus explicitly
protected from culpability under the
CPPA.
While there may be other potentially
impermissible applications of the CPPA,
I doubt that they would be "substantial
... in relation to the statute's plainly
legitimate sweep." Bmadrid, 413 U.S. at
615, 93 S.C. 2908. Rather than invalidate
part of the statute based on possible
problems that may never occur, it is best
to deal with those situations on a case-
by-cases basis. See Feder, 458 U.S. at 781,
102 S.Ct. 3348 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(noting that "[h]ypothetical rulings are
inherently treacherous and prone to lead
us into unforeseen errors"). Accordingly,
I would find that the CPPA is not
substantially overbroad. See Hilta 167
F.3d at 71-74 (finding that the CPPA is
not unconstitutionally overbroad); Unital
Stata v Acsasr 195 F.3d 645, 650-52
(11th Cir.1999) (same).
III.
I also disagree with the majority that the
CPPA is unconstitutionally vague. It is
well settled that a statute is not void for
vagueness unless it fails to "define the
criminal offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited."
Kaler v Lawsam 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103
S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983).
Here, the key phrases of the CPPA are
clearly defined. The CPPA applies to
visual depictions of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct. A minor is
defined as "any person under the age of
eighteen years." 18 U.S.CA. § 2256(1)
(West Supp.1999). In addition, "sexually
explicit conduct" is defined as actual or
simulated "sexual intercourse ...;
bestiality; masturbation; sadistic or
masochistic abuse; or lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area."
18 US.CA. § 2256(2) (West Supp.1999).
Given the detailed definition of sexually
explicit activity, it is unlikely that a
person of ordinary intelligence would be
unable to deterine what activities are
prohibited.
The majority nevertheless finds fault
with the CPPA because it believes that
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the terms "appears to be" and "conveys
the impression" are highly subjective and
could be enforced "in an arbitrary and
discriminatory fashion." * * Once
again, I disagree. With regard to the
apparent age of the depicted individuals,
the government can use the same type of
objective evidence that it relied on
before the CPPA went into effect. For
example, in cases involving prepubescent
individuals, the government can show
the jury the pictures and the jury can
determine for itself whether the virtual
image "appears to be" of a minor. See eg
Unitad Stats vAA rn, 900 F.2d 1385,
1390 n. 4 (9th Cir.1990) (citing a jury
instruction that requires the members of
the jury to decide whether the
prepubescent girls are "minors" based
upon their own "observation of the
pictures"), wt dedal 498 US. 1024, 111
S.Ct. 672, 112 L.Ed.2d 664 (1991). In
cases in which the depicted children have
reached puberty, the government can call
expert witnesses to testify as to the
physical development of the depicted
person, and present testimony regarding
the way the creator, distributor, or
possessor labeled the disks, files, or
videos. See eg. United Sta RA ma7
137 F.3d 652, 653 (1st Cir.1998) (noting
that the pornographic photographs listed
the ages of boys depicted). Based on
these examples, I agree with the First
Circuit which found that the standard for
evaluating the key provisions of the
CPPA "is an objective one." Hika; 167
F.3d at 75. "A jury must decide, based on
the totality of the circumstances, whether
an unsuspecting viewer would consider
the depiction to be an actual individual
under the age of eighteen engaging in
sexual activity." Id
As an additional safeguard against
arbitrary prosecutions, the government
must satisfy the element of scienter
before it can obtain a valid conviction
under the CPPA. See 18 U.S.C.A. §
2252A (West Supp.1999). In any CPPA
prosecution, the government must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the
individual "knowingly" produced,
distributed, or possessed sexually explicit
material and that the material depicts a
person who appeared to the
pornographer to be under the age of
eighteen. Se Id See also Unitad States X-
Citent Vidb In, 513 U.S. 64, 78, 115
S.Ct. 464, 130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994)
(holding that the scienter requirement
"extends to both the sexually explicit
nature of the material and to the age of
the performers"). "Thus, a defendant
who honestly believes that the individual
depicted in the image appears to be 18
years old or older (and is believed by a
jury), or who can show that he knew the
image was created by having a youthful-
looking adult pose for it, must be
acquitted, so long as the image was not
presented or marketed as if it contained a
real minor." Hiltai 167 F.3d at 75-76.
Based on these safeguards, the majority's
concerns about arbitrary and
discriminatory prosecutions are
misplaced. See Id at 74-77 (finding that
the CPPA is not unconstitutionally
vague); Ahord4a 195 F.3d at 652-53
(same).
IV.
In sum, the CPPA is not, as the majority
claims, an attempt to regulate "evil
idea[s]." Instead, the CPPA is an
important tool in the fight against child
sexual abuse. The CPPA's definition of
child pornography provides adequate
notice of the type of images that are
prohibited and does not substantially
encroach on protected expression.
Accordingly, I would find the CPPA
constitutional-
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Justices to Tackle "Virtual" Child Porn
Los Angeles Times
Tuesday, January 23, 2001
David G. Savage
The Supreme Court, entering the new
world of "virtual" pornography, agreed
Monday to decide whether the
government can make it a crime to have
or sell computer-generated images of
children having sex.
Congress has tried repeatedly to stamp
out child pornography of all sorts. Five
years ago, it expanded the definition of
illegal activity to include a "visual
depiction that appears to be a minor"
engaged in sex acts or "conveys the
impression" of even "simulated" sex
involving children.
The new law specifically includes
"computer-generated images" among the
prohibited depictions.
Prosecutors said the change is needed
because of advances in computer
imaging. As the dinosaur movie "Jurassic
Park" demonstrated, computers can
create images that appear to be real. This
kind of pornography can whet the
appetite of pedophiles, prosecutors said,
and therefore is dangerous even if no
real children are involved.
But a coalition of photographers, movie
makers and producers of "adult-oriented
materials" challenged the new law as
unconstitutional. The coalition said its
terms are so broad and vaguely worded
as to include depictions of young
actresses who are not minors and who
are not engaged in actual sex.
The federal appeals court in San
Francisco agreed on a 2-1 vote. The 1st
Amendment prohibits the government
from making it a crime to generate
"images of fictitious children engaged in
imaginary but explicit sexual conduct,"
Judge Donald Molloy said.
He noted that the Supreme Court in the
past has said that child pornography is
not protected as free speech because it
involves the sexual abuse of children.
Although pornographic computer
images are "unquestionably morally
repugnant," the judge said, they cannot
be turned into a crime "when no actual
children are involved."
Government lawyers disagreed and
urged the high court to revive the law
against virtual porn. They said
prosecutors would be hard pressed to
win a conviction against a child
pornographer if they must prove the
illicit image is of an actual child.
Moreover, they said, virtual porn "adds
fuel to the underground child
pornography industry."
On Monday, the justices said they would
hear the case (Reno vs. Free Speech
Coalition, 00-795). The argument will
not be heard until fall and, by then, the
case name will be changed to reflect the
Bush administration's new attorney
general.
In the meantime, prosecutors will be
barred from bringing virtual-child
pornography cases in California and the
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eight other Western states within the
jurisdiction of the U.S. 9th Circuit Court
of Appeals.
Producing or selling child pornography is
punishable by as much as 15 years in
prison. Possession of such pornography
can lead to as much as five years in
prson.
Meanwhile, the court agreed to take up
two regulatory cases that will help
determine whether many consumers will
ever have access to competitive local
phone service and high-speed Internet
access via cable television.
Congress encouraged deregulation and
competition through the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 but, so
far, the measure has produced mostly
litigation.
Local telephone companies are required
to lease their lines to potential
competitors, but it is not clear how
much those competitors must pay.
The Federal Communications
Commission set rates for leasing the
lines, but a federal appeals court struck
down part of the rate-making rules last
year.
On Monday, the Supreme Court agreed
to hear appeals from all of the parties to
the dispute, but it put off the argument
until fall (Verizon Communications vs.
FC, 00-511, and others).
The second case concerns how much
cable TV firms must pay to use the
utility poles that can carry their new
Internet lines into homes.
In the past, those rates had been
regulated, and Congress hoped the new
law would encourage cable TV firms to
provide Internet competition to local
phone caniers.
But another federal appeals court said
that the rates for cable companies' use of
the utility poles no longer are regulated if
they provide Internet service.
In the fall, the court will hear the appeals
from the FOC and the cable industry in
the case (National Cable TV Assn. vs.
Gulf Power, 00-832)
In other actions, the court:
* Refused to hear pop singer Michael
Bolton's appeal of a $ 5.4-million jury
verdict over his 1991 hit "Love Is a
Wonderful Thing" (Bolton vs. Three
Boys Music Corp., 00-689). He was sued
for illegal copying by the Isley Brothers,
who recorded a song by the same name
in 1964.
* Agreed to decide whether employee
health-care plans that pay for an accident
victim's medical claims can later recoup
any money won by the victim in a
lawsuit. Janette Knudson was left a
quadriplegic after an auto accident, and
her health plan paid $ 411,000 for her
medical care. But when she won a
substantial settlement from those
responsible for the accident, her health
plan sued to recover its payments
(Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance
Co. vs. Knudson, 99-1786).
Copyright ' The Times Mirror
Company
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Justices to Weigh Issue of Child Pornography and Computer-Generated
Images
The New York Times
Tuesday, January 23, 2001
Linda Greenhouse
While it has long been beyond debate
that the government can make it a crime
to possess or to distribute child
pornography, a case the Supreme Court
accepted today poses a new
constitutional question for the computer
age: whether the First Amendment
permits criminalizing child pornography
that depicts not actual children but
computer-generated images that look like
actual children.
A 1996 federal law, the Child
Pornography Prevention Act, makes it a
crime to distribute, receive, or possess an
image that "appears to be of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct" or
to describe such an image in a way that
"conveys the impression" that it depicts
an actual child.
Congress in passing the law and the
Justice Department in defending it in
courts around the country have argued
that it provides an essential margin of
safety for real children who are at risk of
exploitation by the burgeoning and
increasingly Internet-driven child
pornography industry. The sophisticated
computer-generated images help sustain
the market and desensitize viewers,
Congress concluded. The law also makes
it a crime to present people who are
actually over age 18 in ways that make
viewers think they are looking at child
pornography.
But in a First Amendment challenge
brought by an adult entertainment trade
association, a federal appeals court ruled
in December 1999 that the phrases
"appears to be" and "conveys the
impression" were unconstitutionally
vague.
The law set a "highly subjective"
standard that left reasonable people
uncertain of their potential criminal
liability and gave too much discretion to
law enforcement, a panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held in a 2-to-1 opinion.
The appeals court, which sits in San
Francisco, said the only governmental
interest it would recognize was "the
protection of the actual children used in
the production of child pornography."
There was no proof that real children
would be victimized as the result of the
existence and dissemination of fabricated
images, the court said.
Three other federal appeals courts have
upheld the law in the course of hearing
appeals by people charged with violating
it. By contrast, this case, Reno v. the
Free Speech Coalition, No. 00-795, did
not involve a criminal prosecution; the
plaintiffs went to court seeking a
declaration of unconstitutionality.
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In its brief opposing Supreme Court
review of its appeals court victory, the
trade organization told the justices that
its members "strongly oppose child
pornography" but nonetheless were
"threatened and injured" by the law
because they "produce, distribute,
and/or possess materials, including film,
photographs, paintings and
computerized images that could easily,
although wrongly, be deemed to contain
sexually explicit depictions of minors."
The Justice Department appeal, filed by
the Clinton administration two months
ago and certain to be carried forward by
the new administration, told the justices
that the Ninth Circuit's ruling would
harm prosecution of actual child
pornography because computer imaging
technology has advanced to the point
that it is very difficult for prosecutors to
prove that a pornographic image was of
a real child.
"The prohibitions at issue here ensure
that people who disseminate or possess
pornographic depictions of actual
children will not escape punishment in
those circumstances," the brief said.
The government said the Ninth Circuit's
conclusion on vagueness was "seriously
misguided" because the standard for
enforcing the law was an objective one:
"the relevant inquiry is whether a
reasonable unsuspecting viewer would
consider the depiction to be of an actual
individual under the age of 18 engaged in
sexual activity," the government told the
court.
Furthermore, the government said, the
law required any violation to be
"knowing," a requirement that "further
diminishes anyvagueness concerns."
This case, as well as four others the
justices granted today, will be argued in
October, at the start of the court's next
term. The argument calendar for the
current tern, which extends thmugh the
fourth week in April, is now fully
booked.
There were also these other
developments at the court today.
Gambling Tax
The justices accepted an appeal filed by
two Indian tribes in Oklahoma and
agreed to decide whether tribes must pay
the federal gambling tax on their
earnings from lottery-type games. The
two tribes, the Chickasaw Nation and
the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, both
offer pull-tab games, a kind of instant-
cash lottery similar to those run by many
state governments.
State-conducted lotteries are exempt
from the federal wagering tax, an excise
tax of one-quarter of 1 percent on
earnings from lotteries. The tax raises
very little money for the federal treasury
-- $13.8 million in 1999, compared with
$21.2 billion from the federal excise tax
on gasoline -- but has been a major
irritant to Indian tribes.
At issue in the case, Chickasaw Nation v.
United States, No. 00-507, is whether a
separate federal law regulating Indian
gambling places tribes on the same
footing as states in extending to them
the same tax exemption. The language of
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act is
ambiguous on this point, and nearly
simultaneous rulings of two federal
appeals courts interpreted it in opposite
ways.
In this case, the United States Court of
Appeals for the 10th Circuit, in Denver,
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found that the tribes were not exempt.
The government did not oppose
Supreme Court review, however, because
it recently lost a similar case before the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit here and told the justices
that the question needed to be resolved
"to enable the United States to
administer the tax laws consistently to all
Indian gaming operators."
Pregnancy Discrimination
Without comment, the court turned
down an appeal brought on behalf of
hundreds of women who took maternity
leave while working for AT&T and its
subsidiaries before 1979, when federal
law made it illegal for employers to
discriminate on the basis of pregnancy.
The telephone companies, along with
many other employers, did not count
pregnancy leave for purposes of
seniority, while giving full seniority credit
to workers who took leaves for other
temporary disabilities.
As a result, many female employees at
what is now Ameritech, one of the
companies formed as a result of the 1984
breakup of AT&T, did not have enough
seniority to take advantage of a lucrative
early retirement plan in 1994.
Because women in similar situations had
brought lawsuits against other
companies, Ameritech went to Federal
District Court in Chicago in 1997
seeking a declaration that its use of its
old seniority system to calculate eligibility
for the new retirement benefits did not
violate any of several federal laws dealing
with pensions and sex discrimination.
The women and their union, the
Communications Workers of America, in
turn sued Ameritech.
The company won in both the district
court and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in
Chicago, which held that the company
had treated pregnancy leave in a way that
was legal at the time and that was
violating no law in using a calculation of
accrued service that dated to those days.
In their appeal, Communications
Workers of America v. Ameritech
Benefit Plan, No. 00-864, the women
said the court should resolve an issue
that applied to a generation of female
workers, with tens of thousands of
women in the former Bell system alone
facing reduced retirement benefits
because of earlier pregnancy
discrimination.
Copyright 0 2001 The New York Tim
Company
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00-1293 Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union
Ruling Below (Anrican Cil Lildvti Urmn u Reno, 3d Cir., 217 F.3d 162, 69 U.S.L.W.
1044, 28 Media L. Rep. 1897, 21 Communications Reg. (P &F) 622)
Child Online Protections Act's ban on knowingly making communications in interstate or
foreign commerce by means of World Wide Web "that is available to any minor and that
includes any material that is harmful to minors," which is to be determined in part by
whether average person "apply contemporary community standards" would find material
designed to pander to minors' prurient interest, likely violates First Amendment.
Question Presented: Did court of appeals properly bar enforcement of Child Online
Protection Act, 47 U.S.C § 231, on First Amendment grounds because it relies on
community standards to identify material that is harmful to minors?
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, et al., Appellees
V.
Janet RENO, Appellant
United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
Decided June 22, 2000
GARTHi, Circuit Judge:
This appeal "presents a conflict between
one of society's most cherished rights--
freedom of expression--and one of the
government's most profound
obligations--the protection of minors."
A nrican Boesdles v Wdb, 919 F.2d
1493, 1495 (11th Cir.1990). The
government challenges the District
Court's issuance of a preliminary
injunction which prevents the
enforcement of the Child Online
Protection Act, Pub.L. No. 105-277, 112
Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified at 47 U.S.C §
231) ("COPA"), enacted in October of
1998. At issue is COPA's
constitutionality, a statute designed to
protect minors from "harmful material"
measured by "contemporary community
standards" knowingly posted on the
World Wide , Web ("Web")
commercial purposes. * * *
for
We will affirm the District Court's grant
of a preliminary injunction because we
are confident that the ACLU's attack on
COPA's constitutionality is likely to
succeed on the merits. Because material
posted on the Web is accessible by all
Internet users worldwide, and because
current technology does not permit a
Web publisher to restrict access to its
site based on the geographic locale of
each particular Internet user, COPA
essentially requires that every Web
publisher subject to the statute abide by
the most restrictive and conservative
state's community standards in order to
avoid criminal liability. Thus, because the
standard by which COPA gauges
whether material is "harmful to minors"
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is based on identifying "contemporary
community standards" the inability of
Web publishers to restrict access to their
Web sites based on the geographic locale
of the site visitor, in and of itself,
imposes an impermissible burden on
constitutionally protected First
Amendment speech.
In affirming the District Court, we are
forced to recognize that, at present, due
to technological limitations, there may be
no other means by which harmful
material on the Web may be
constitutionally restricted, although, in
light of rapidly developing technological
advances, what may now be impossible
to regulate constitutionally may, in the
not-too-distant future, become feasible.
I. BA CKGROUND
COPA was enacted into law on October
21, 1998. Commercial Web publishers
subject to the statute that distribute
material that is harmful to minors are
required under COPA to ensure that
minors do not access 'the harmful
material on their Web site. COPA is
Congress's second attempt to regulate
the dissemination to minors of indecent
material on the Web/Internet. The
Supreme Court had earlier, on First
Amendment grounds, struck down
Congress's first endeavor, the
Communications Decency Act, ("CDA")
which it passed as part of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. See
Rno vA CL U, 521 U.S. 844, 117 S.C.
2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997) ("ReoIl").
B. COPA
COPA, the present statute, attempts to
"address[ ] the specific concerns raised
by the Supreme Court" in invalidating
the CDA. H.R REP. NO. 105-775 at 12
(1998); See S.R. REP. NO. 105-225, at 2
(1998). COPA prohibits an individual or
entity from
knowingly and with knowledge
of the character of the material,
in interstate or foreign commerce
by means of the World Wide
Web, making] any
communication for commercial
purposes that is available to any
minor and that includes any
material that is harmful to
minors.
47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (emphasis added).
As part of its attempt to cure the
constitutional defects found in the CDA,
Congress sought to define most of
COPA's key terms. COPA attempts, for
example, to restrict its scope to material
on the Web rather than on the Internet
as a whole;9 to target only those Web
communications made for "commercial
purposes";10 and to limit its scope to
9 COPA defines the clause "by means of the
World Wide Web" as the "placement of material
in a computer server-based file archive so that it is
publicly accessible, over the Internet, using
hypertext transfer protocol or any successor
protocol." 47 U.S.C §231(e)(1).
10 COPA defines the clause "commercial
purposes" as those individuals or entities that are
"engaged in the business of making such
communications." 47 U.S.C 231(e)(2)(A). In
turn, COPA defines a person "engaged in the
business" as one
who makes a communication, or offers
to make a communication, by means of
the World Wide Web, that includes any
material that is harmful to minors,
devotes time, attention, or labor to such
activities, as a regular course of such
person's trade or business, with the
dIectize of earning a profit as a result of
such activities (although it is not
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only that material deemed "harmful to
minors."
Under COPA, whether material
published on the Web is "harmful to
minors" is governed by a three-part test,
ea&b of which must be found before
liability can attach: * * *
(A) the average person, applying
crporay cmnmity standank, would
find, taking the material as a whole and
with respect to minors, is designed to
appeal to, or is designed to pander to,
the prurient interest;
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a
manner patently offensive with respect
to minors, an actual or simulated sexual
act or sexual contact, an actual or
simulated normal or perverted sexual act,
or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or
post-pubescent female breast; and
() taken as a whole, lacks serious,
literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value for minors.
47 U.S.C § 231(e) (6) (emphasis added).*
**
The parties conceded at oral argument
that this "contemporary community
standards" test applies to those
communities within the United States,
and not to foreign communities.
Therefore, the more liberal community
standards of Amsterdam or the more
restrictive community standards of
Tehran would not impact upon the
analysis of whether material is "harmful
to minors" under COPA
necessary that the person mke a profit or
that the making or offering to make such
communications be the person's sole or
principal business or source of income).
Id § 2311e)(2)(1)
COPA also provides Web publishers
subject to the statute with affirmative
defenses. If a Web publisher "has
restricted access by minors to material
that is harmful to minors" through the
use of a "credit card, debit account, adult
access code, or adult personal
identification number ... a digital
certificate that verifies age ... or by any
other reasonable measures that are
feasible under available technology,"
then no liability will attach to the Web
publisher even if a minor should
nevertheless gain access to restricted
material under COPA. 47 U.S.C §
231(c) (1). * * *COPA violators face both
criminal (maximum fines of $50,000 and
a maximum prison term of six months,
or both) and civil (fines of up to $50,000
for each day of violation) penalties. ***
** *
II. A NA L YSIS
In determining whether a preliminary
injunction is warranted, we must
consider
(1) whether the movant has shown a
reasonable probability of success on the
merits; (2) whether the movant will be
irreparably harmed by denial of the relief;
(3) whether granting preliminary relief
will result in even greater harm to the
nonmoving party; and (4) whether
granting the preliminary relief will be in
the public interest.
Allgeny Errg Inc v DQE, Inc, 171
F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir.1999) (citing
ACLU v Bad Hose Pike Reiad Bd ef
Edue, 84 F.3d 1471, 1477 n. 2 (3d
Cir.1996) (en banc)). We review a district
court's grant of a preliminary injunction
according to a three-part standard. Legal
conclusions are reviewed de novo,
findings of fact are reviewed for clear
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error, and the "ultimate decision to grant
or deny the preliminary injunction" is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. See
Maldando v Houstaun, 157 F.3d 179, 183
(3d Cir.1998), a=t denia 526 U.S. 1130,
119 S.C. 1802, 143 L.Ed.2d 1007 (1999).
A. Reasaldepmhdubibly ofsuans on th
nElits
We begin our analysis by considering
what, for this case, is the most significant
prong of the preliminary injunction test--
whether the ACLU met its burden of
establishing a reasonable probability of
succeeding on the merits in proving that
COPA trenches upon the First
Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Initially, we note that the
District Court correctly determined that as
a content-based restriction on speech,
COPA is "both presumptively invalid and
subject to strict scrutiny analysis." See Ren
III, 31 F.Supp.2d at 493. As in all areas of
constitutional strict scrutiny jurisprudence,
the government must establish that the
challenged statute is narrowly tailored to
meet a compelling state interest, and that
it seeks to protect its interest in a manner
that is the least restrictive of protected
speech. Sa; eg, Sdwarhogyv Citizens for a
Better Envermnt, 444 U.S. 620, 637, 100
S.Ct. 826, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980); Salle
Ca=n cf if v FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126,
109 S.Ct. 2829 (1989). * * *
It is undisputed that the government has
a compelling interest in protecting
children from material that is harmful to
them, even if not obscene by adult
standards. Sa? Rem III, 31 F.Supp.2d at
495 (citing SaNe, 492 U.S. at 126, 109
S.Ct. 2829 (1989); Gi~rsig v New York,
390 U.S. 629, 639-40, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 20
L.Ed.2d 195 (1968)). At issue is whether,
in achieving this compelling objective,
Congress has articulated a
constitutionally permissible means to
achieve its objective without curtailing
the protected free speech rights of
adults. See Reno III, 31 F.Supp.2d at 492
(citing Sable, 492 U.S. at 127, 109 S.Ct.
2829; Butler v Mihigm, 352 U.S. 380,
383, 77 S.Ct. 524, 1 L.Ed.2d 412 (1957)).
As we have observed, the District Court
found that it had not--holding that
COPA was not likely to succeed in
surviving strict scrutiny analysis.
We base our particular determination of
COPA's likely unconstitutionality,
however, on COPA's reliance on
"contemporary community standards" in
the context of the electronic medium of
the Web to identify material that is
harmful to minors. The overbreadth of
COPA's definition of "harmful to
minors" applying a "contemporary
community standards" clause-- although
virtually ignored by the parties and the
amicus in their respective briefs but
raised by us at oral argument--so
concerns us that we are persuaded that
this aspect of COPA, without reference
to its other provisions, must lead
inexorably to a holding of a likelihood of
unconstitutionality of the entire COPA
statute. Hence we base our opinion
entirely on the basis of the likely
unconstitutionality of this clause, even
though the District Court relied on
numerous other grounds. * * *
** *We are not persuaded that the
Supreme Court's concern with respect to
the "community standards" criterion has
been sufficiently remedied by Congress
in COPA.
* *I *
272
Despite the government's assertion,
"[e]ach medium of expression 'must be
assessed for First Amendment purposes
by standards suited to it, for each may
present its own problems.' " Rem III, 31
F.Supp.2d at 495 (quoting Sadstern
Prnion, Ltd v Catu( 420 U.S. 546,
557, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 43 L.Ed.2d 448
(1975)). See also Unital States v Playiy
Entertainnt GCq, Inc, 529 U.S. 803, at
---- , 120 S.Ct. 1878, 1887, 146 L.Ed.2d
865 (2000). In considering "the unique
factors that affect communication in the
new and technology-laden medium of
the Web," we are convinced that there
are crucial differences between a "brick
and mortar outlet" and the online Web
that dramatically affect a First
Amendment analysis. Id
Unlike a "brick and mortar outlet" with a
specific geographic locale, and unlike the
voluntary physical mailing of material
from one geographic location to another,
as in Miller, the uncontroverted facts
indicate that the Web is nac gograpically
cnrtraind See Reno III, 31 F.Supp.2d at
482- 92; Anrrican Libraies, 969 F.Supp.
at 169 ("geography, however, is a
virtually meaningless constmuct on the
Internet"). Indeed, and of extreme
significance, is the fact, as found by the
District Court, that Web publishers are
without any means to limit access to
their sites based on the geographic
location of particular Internet users. As
soon as information is published on a
Web site, it is accessible to all other Web
visitors. See Anrrican Libranes, 969
F.Supp. at 166; Reno III, 31 F.Supp.2d at
483. Current technology prevents Web
publishers from circumventing particularjurisdictions or limiting their site's
content "from entering any [specific]
geographic community." Rena III, 31
F.Supp.2d at 484. This key difference
necessarily affects our analysis in
attempting to define what contemporary
community standards should or could
mean in a medium without geographic
boundaries.
In expressing its concern over the wholly
unprecedented broad coverage of the
CDA's scope, the Supreme Court has
already noted that because of the
peculiar geography-free nature of
cyberspace, a "community standards"
test would essentially require every Web
communication to abide by the most
restrictive community's standards. See
Reno II, 521 U.S. at 877-78, 117 S.Ct.
2329. Similarly, to avoid liability under
COPA, affected Web publishers would
either need to severely censor their
publications or implement an age or
credit card verification system whereby
any material that might be deemed
harmful by the most puritan of
communities in any state is shielded
behind such a verification system.
Shielding such vast amounts of material
behind verification systems would
prevent access to protected material by
any adult seventeen or over without the
necessary age verification credentials.
Moreover, it would completely bar
access to those materials to all minors
under seventeen--even if the material
would not otherwise have been deemed
"harmful" to them in their respective
geographic communities.
Our concern with COPA's adoption of
Miller's "contemporary community
standards" test by which to determine
whether material is harmful to minors is
with respect to its overbreadth in the
context of the Web medium. Because no
technology acrrendy exists by which Web
publishers may avoid liability, such
publishers would necessarily be
compelled to abide by the "standards of
the community most likely to be
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offended by the message" Renm II, 521
U.S. at 877-78, 117 S.Ct. 2329, even if
the same material would not have been
deemed harmful to minors in all other
communities. Moreover, by restricting
their publications to meet the more
stringent standards of less liberal
communities, adults whose constitutional
rights permit them to view such
materials would be unconstitutionally
deprived of those rights. Thus, this result
imposes an overreaching burden and
restriction on constitutionally protected
speech. ***
We recognize that invalidating a statute
because it is overbroad is "strong
medicine." Bmazdick v Ckaham, 413
U.S. 601, 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d
830 (1973). As such, before concluding
that a statute is unconstitutionally
overbroad, we seek to determine if the
statute is " 'readily susceptible' to a
narrowing construction that would make
it constitutional ... [because courts] will
not rewrite a ... law to conform it to
constitutional requirements." Viginia u
Anrican Bcksdes' Ass'n, 484 US. 383,
397, 108 S.Ct. 636, 98 L.Ed.2d 782
(1988) (quoting E rzncik v City f
Jacksoaille 422 US. 205, 95 S.Ct. 2268,
45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975)). S& abo Bazdukk,
413 U.S. at 613, 93 S.C. 2908; Foath
Ctxy v Natimalist Mowmnt, 505 U.S.
123, 130, 112 S.Ct. 2395, 120 L.Ed.2d
101 (1992); Shea, 930 F.Supp. at 939.
Two possible ways to limit the
interpretation of COPA are (a) assigning
a narrow meaning to the language of the
statute itself, or (b) deleting that portion
of the statute that is unconstitutional,
while preserving the remainder of the
statute intact. See eg Bnxkett u Spdkar
A mad, Inc, 472 U.S. 491, 502, 105 S.Ct.
2794, 86 L.Ed.2d 394 (1985); Shea, 930
F.Supp. at 939. We therefore turn our
attention to whether either limiting
construction is feasible here.
The government, in attempting to make
use of the first of these salvaging
mechanisms, suggests that we should
interpret narrowly the "contemporary
community standards" language in
COPA as an "adult" rather than as a
"geographic" standard. The House
Report itself suggests this construction
to sidestep the potential constitutional
problems raised by the Supreme Court in
interpreting the CDA's use of a
"community standards" phrase. * **
***
Despite the government's effort to
salvage this clause of COPA from
unconstitutionality, we have before us no
evidence to suggest that adults eweyhere
in America would share the same
standards for determining what is
harmful to minors. To the contrary, it is
significant to us that throughout case
law, community standards have always
been interpreted as a geographic
standard without uniformity. Se, eg.,
Anrm an Libraria Ass'n v Pataki, 969
F.Supp. 160, 182-83 (S.D.N.Y.1997)
("Courts have long recognized, however,
that there is no single 'prevailing
community standard' in the United
States. Thus, even were all 50 states to
enact laws that were verbatim copies of
the New York [absenity] Act, Internet
users would still be subject to discordant
responsibilities.").
With respect to the second salvaging
mechanism, it is an " 'elementary
principle that the same statute may be in
part constitutional and in part
unconstitutional, and that if the parts are
wholly independent of each other, that
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which is constitutional may stand while
that which is unconstitutional will be
rejected' " Bnxket v SpckareAmaJs, Irm,
472 U.S. 491, 502, 105 S.Ct. 2794, 86
L.Ed.2d 394 (1985) (quoting Allen
Lciaam, 103 U.S. 80, 83-84, 26 L.Ed.
318 (1880)). As a result, if it is possible
for a court to identify a particular part of
the statute that is unconstitutional, and
by striking cly that lauge the court
could leave the remainder of the statute
intact and within the intent of Congress,
courts should do so. See Alaska A idiws,
Inc v Bak, 480 U.S. 678, 684-85, 107
S.Ct. 1476, 94 L.Ed.2d 661 (1987).
Here, however, striking "contemporary
community standards" from COPA is
not likely to succeed in salvaging
COPA's constitutionality as this standard
is an integral part of the statute,
permeating and influencing the whole of
the statute. We see no means by which
to excise those "unconstitutional"
elements of the statute from those that
are constitutional (assuming for the
moment, without deciding, that the
remaining clauses of COPA are held to
be constitutional). This is particularly so
in a preliminary injunction context when
we are convinced that the very test or
standard that COPA has established to
determine what is harmful to minors is
more likely than not to be held
unconstitutional See Bxha, 472 U.S. at
504-05, 105 S.Ct. 2794.
* * *As regulation under existing
technology is unreasonable here, we
conclude that with respect to this first
prong of our preliminary injunction
analysis, it is more likely than not that
COPA will be found unconstitutional on
the merits. * *
B. Irparae Harn By Denial qfRdif
The second prong of our preliminary
injunction analysis requires us to
consider "whether the movant will be
irreparably harmed by denial of the
relief." Alkghey Emgg In v DQE, Ie
171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir.1999).
Generally, "[i]n a First Amendment
challenge, a plaintiff who meets the first
prong of the test for a preliminary
injunction will almost certainly meet the
second, since irreparable injury normally
arises out of the deprivation of speech
rights." Ro I, 929 F.Supp. 824 at 866.
This case is no exception.
If a preliminary injunction were not to
issue, COPA-affected Web publishers
would most assuredly suffer irreparable
harm--the curtailment of their
constitutionally protected right to free
speech. As the Supreme Court has
clearly stated, "the loss of First
Amendment freedoms, for even minimal
periods of time, unquestionably
constitutes irreparable injury." Elud v
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673,
49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). We, therefore,
conclude that this element of our
preliminary injunction analysis has been
satisfied.
C Iryury CWzeighs Harm
The third prong of our preliminary
injunction analysis requires us to
consider "whether granting preliminary
relief will result in even greater harm to
the nonmoving party." Alkgeny Ink v
DQE, I, 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d
Cir.1999). We are convinced that in
balancing the parties' respective interests,
CDPA's threatened constraint on
constitutionally protected free speech far
outweighs the damage that would be
imposed by our failure to affirm this
preliminary injunction. We are also aware
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that without a preliminary injunction,
Web publishers subject to COPA would
immediately be required to censor
constitutionally protected speech for
adults, or incur substantial financial costs
to implement COPA's affirmative
defenses. * * * Therefore, we affirm the
District Court's holding that plaintiffs
sufficiently met their burden in
establishing this third prong of the
preliminary injunction analysis.
D. Publiclntenst
As the fourth and final element of our
preliminary injunction analysis, we
consider "whether granting the
preliminary relief will be in the public
interest." Allgheny Inc v DQE, Inc, 171
F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir.1999). Curtailing
constitutionally protected speech will not
advance the public interest, and "neither
the Govemment nor the public generally
can claim an interest in the enforcement
of an unconstitutional law." Rem 1, 929
F.Supp. at 866. Having met this final
element of our preliminary injunction
analysis, the District Court properly
granted the ACLUs petition for a
preliminary injunction.
III. CONCL USION
Due to current technological limitations,
COPA--Congress' laudatory attempt to
achieve its compelling objective of
protecting minors from harmful material
on the World Wide Web--is more likely
than not to be found unconstitutional as
overbroad on the merits. * * * Because
the ACLU has met its burden in
establishing all four of the necessary
elements to obtain a preliminary
injunction, and the District Court
properly exercised its discretion in
issuing the preliminary injunction, we
will affirm the District Court's order.
In so affirming, we approvingly reiterate
the sentiments aptly noted by the
District Court: "sometimes we must
make decisions that we do not like. We
make them because they are right, right
in the sense that the law and the
Constitution, as we see them, compel the
result." RenoIII, 31 F.Supp.2d at 498. * *
* We also express our confidence and
firm conviction that developing
technology will soon render the
"community standards" challenge moot,
thereby making congressional regulation
to protect minors from harmful material
on the Web constitutionally practicable.
Therefore, we will affirm the District
Court's order dated February 1, 1999,
issuing a preliminary injunction.
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High Court to Hear Internet Porn Case
Los Angeles Times
Tuesday, May 22, 2001
David G. Savage
The Supreme Court said Monday that it
will consider reviving a disputed law that
makes it a crime to put on the Internet
sexually explicit material that can be
viewed by minors.
The case once again pits the free-speech
rights of adults against the government's
interest in protecting children.
Four years ago, the justices struck down
a broad federal law designed to protect
children from computer pornography.
That law, the Communications Decency
Act, left the sponsors of adult-oriented
Web sites--and even sponsors of art
museum sites--nearly defenseless to a
charge that they had exposed children to
nude photographs or other inappropriate
material.
Undaunted, Congress in 1998 passed a
somewhat narrower law. It applies to
sites on the World Wide Web that
operate for "commercial purposes." And
it says sponsors can protect themselves
by requiring users to furnish a credit card
number or an adult access code.
But lawyers for the American Civil
Liberties Union challenged the new law,
the Clild Online Protection Act.
A federal judge in Philadelphia blocked
the law from going into effect. Last year,
the U.S. court of appeals affirmed that
decision.
The lower court judges concluded thelaw was vague. It says Web sites may not
post material that is "harmful to minors"
based on "contemporary community
standards." That approach would allow
the most conservative community in
America to set the standards, the judges
said, because a Web site posted in San
Francisco can be accessed in Provo,
Utah.
They also said the requirement of using
credit cards or access numbers would
pose a burden. Many free sites also
might be deemed "commercial" because
they post ads. And some of these sites,
such as bookstores, art galleries or AIDS
support groups, might include material
unsuitable for children.
"At present, due to technological
limitations, there may be no means by
which harmful material on the Web maybe constitutionally restricted," wrote
Judge Leonard Garth of the U.S. 3rd
Crcuit Court of Appeals. He mentioned,
however, software that screens out
content.
Justice Department lawyers appealed on
behalf of Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft,
arguing that the revised law is more
narrow and focused, and should not be
struck down just because it could cause
problems for Web sites.
On Monday, the court said it will hear
the case of Ashcroft vs. the ACLU, 00-
1293, in the fall.
Copyright ( 2001 The Times Mirror
Company
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Court to Review Online Porn Law
The Washington Post
Tuesday, May 22, 2001
Charles Lane
The Supreme Court agreed yesterday to
decide whether the main federal law
aimed at keeping children from viewing
pornography on the Intemet would
violate the constitutional guarantee of
free speech.
The Child Online Protection Act
(COPA), passed by Congress and signed
by President Bill Clinton in 1998, makes
it a crime for commercial Web sites to
present materials "harmful to minors,"
unless the companies try their best to
keep children from gaining access.
But opponents say that technological
methods for screening out children are
costly and burdensome to adult users,
and that the bill would unavoidably deter
adults from using legitimate Web sites,
such as those offering gynecological
information.
"You can't force adults to reduce their
language to speech that's fit only for
children," said Ann Beeson, an attorney
for the American Civil Liberties Union,
which challenged the law in federal
court.
The case is a replay of sorts for the
Supreme Court, which struck down an
earlier version of the law on free-speech
grounds in a unanimous 1997 ruling.
COPA was Congress's effort to take the
court's 1997 decision into account.
Although the previous law sought to
restrict all "indecent" material on the
Web, COPA does not apply to chat
rooms and e-mail, targeting only for-
profit sites.
The Justice Department and advocates
of the new law say that those changes
should enable it to pass muster this time
around -- in part because recent
technological developments make it
easier for Web sites to screen out
children.
"COPA was meant to follow the road
map the Supreme Court laid out," said
Bob Flores, vice president and senior
counsel of the National Law Center for
Children and Families.
Lower federal courts have sided with the
bill's opponents. In the decision that the
justices agreed yesterday to review, a
Philadelphia-based appeals court ruled
last year that COPA's reliance on
"community standards" to define what is
hamful to minors was too broad.
Given the Internet's nationwide scope,
the court ruled, it is impossible to tell
what community's standards should take
precedence.
The court will hear oral arguments in the
case, Ashcroft v. ACLU, during the term
that begins in October. A decision is
likely before July 2002.
Copyright c 2001 The Washington Pat
278
Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Second Case on Internet Porn
The Washington Times
Tuesday, May 22, 2001
Frank J. Murray
Supreme Court justices yesterday agreed
to referee a rematch of the battle over
Internet sexual material that may be
available to children, assuring a second
appeal involving child-pornography
issues on the fall docket.
The justices agreed to hear a case titled
Attorney General John Ashcroft v. the
American Civil Liberties Union, a closely
watched battle over whether
"community standards" may be applied
to enforce the 1998 Child Online
Protection Act.
In a second attempt to bar material
"harmful to minors," that law was passed
in the wake of a decision weakening the
1996 Communications Decency Act.
The ACLU pronounced itself ready
yesterday for Round 2 of its fight to
nullify such provisions, even as the
American Center for Law and Justice
seized "an important opportunity" and
entered the case on behalf of members
of Congress to support the law's original
objectives.
"The First Amendment protects free
speech but was never intended to permit
the sale or distribution of porn to
children on the Internet or anywhere
else," said Jay Sekulow, the ACLJ's chief
counsel.
In other actions yesterday, the court:
--Turned away without explanation a
voters' challenge to changes in nine of
Houston's 14 city council districts, some
of which perpetuate minority
dominance.
Justice Clarence Thomas dissented,
saying the pending national
reapportionment makes it imperative
that the high court resolve whether its
one-man, one-vote decisions relate to the
total number of people in a district or to
voting populations.
--Ended the long fight by some federal
judges against deducting Social Security
and Medicare taxes from their pay by
ruling the broad Medicare tax must be
paid while a retroactive Social Security
tax unconstitutionally targeted federal
judges, whose compensation cannot be
reduced.
--Rejected an appeal by former Arkansas
Judge David Hale, who said federal
immunity should nullify his conviction
and 21-day state sentence for lying to
state regulators about the solvency of his
insurance company.
Hale claimed he was prosecuted in
retaliation for giving Whitewater-related
testimony against President Clinton and
Mr. Clinton's former business partners in
connection with a $300,000 federally
guaranteed loan that was not repaid.
Child pornography already was to be
argued in the first day or two of the term
that begins Oct. 1 in a case testing
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whether laws against depicting real
children in sexually exploitive material
apply to "virtual children" created
entirely by computers.
That case, Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, has drawn many of the same
outside interests as the appeal accepted
yesterday.
The law under attack in the ACLU case
requires commercial Web sites displaying
explicit material to collect a credit card
number or access code as proof of age,
and it defines indecency more
specifically. It carries criminal penalties
of up to six months in jail or civil fines
of up to $50,000.
"We're talking about material that would
be harmful to minors. That is a test we
have applied for years in the real world,"
said Robert Flores, vice president of the
National Law Center for Children and
Families.
"If you walk into a bookstore, the
pornography is wrapped, or behind a
blinder or will be in a place where it is
difficult for young children to reach it,"
said Mr. Flores, whose group filed a brief
supporting the law.
The ACLUs lead attorney in the case
voiced confidence the court again will
strike down virtually identical provisions
that restrict the availability of material
intended for adults simply because
children may encounter objectionable
pictures that are not legally obscene.
"We welcome the opportunity to
demonstrate to the court that Congress
has once again fundamentally
misunderstood the nature of the
Internet," said Ann Beeson, lead attorney
in a case originally brought against the
Clinton administration.
Copyright © 2001 News World
Communications, Inc
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00-1249 Thomas v. Chicago Park District
Ruling Below (7' cir., 227 F.3d 921):
Chicago Park District's permit procedure for group of 50 or more seeking to use park, which
requires action on permit application within 28 days and decision by superintendent on appeal from
denial of permit within 7 days, is too tight to permit evidentiary hearing with oral testimony, cross-
examination, and other accouterments of trial, and given that applicants have recourse to judicial
remedies in both state and federal courts, possible inadequacies of state judicial remedy (for which
there is no deadline), which in any event are balanced by expedition of administrative procedure that
barring oral testimony allows, are trivial; prior restraint cases such as Frednmn v Marard 380 U.S.
51 (1965), which imposed deadline on judicial review of permit applications for sexually oriented
businesses, involve censorship or quasi-censorship based on government's judgment about propriety
of content or message of proposed expressive activity, and so do not extend to time, place, and
manner licensing systems involving more general requirements of kind at issue here, which were not
shown to have been applied to restrict expression of unpopular ideas; although park district might
abuse its discretion to deny permit for various reasons such as misrepresentation in application,
failure to tender fee, and applicant's having previously damaged park property, or to waive permit
fee for events protected by First Amendment, elimination of that discretion would make regulation
more restrictive than it is, and curtailing speech is odd way of protecting speech; accordingly,judgment for park distrct on facial challenge to permit procedure brought by plaintiffs seeking to
use park for rallies in favor of repealing laws criminalizing sale of marijuana is affirmed.
Questions Presented: (1) Does immediate access to courts following denial of permit for corepolitical speech in traditional public forum constitute prompt judicial review, as required byFerran
v Maran without regard to length of time allowed for judicial decisions? (2) Must ordinance
require permit for core political speech in traditional public forum include each of procedural
safeguards established in Fn-un v Maryand or is that cause only applicable to sexually explicit
speech presented by adult entertainment businesses? (3) Is content-neutral ordinance that requirespermit for core political speech in traditional public forum analyzed as prior restraint or under moredeferential standard applicable to time, place, and manner regulations? (4) May plaintiff bring facialchallenge to permit ordinance that restricts political. Speech in public forum without first having toprove that ordinance has been unconstitutionally applied to him because of government's hostility toplaintiff or his proposed speech? (5) Can ordinance requiring permit for core political speech intraditional public forum include unfettered discretion to issue or withhold permits?
Caren Crank THOMAS, et al, Plaintiffs-Appellants
v.
CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
Decided September 14, 2000
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POSNER, Circuit Judge.
Among the regulations of the Chicago Park
District governing the use of its parks is one
requiring that a permit be obtained for an
assembly, parade, demonstration, sporting
event, or other use of the park by a group of
50 or more persons. Chi. Park Dist.Code ch.
VII 5 C. The regulation spells out the criteria
for the grant of such a permit, and the
procedures for obtaining it and for
challenging its denial, in considerable detail.
The plaintiffs, who want to use the park for
rallies in favor of repealing the laws
criminalizing the sale of marijuana, claim that
the regulation violates the free-speech clause
of the First Amendment "on its face," that is,
without regard to whether the regulation has
been applied in such a way as to infringe the
right of free speech. Fayh Ccamty v
Natait Mourznt, 505 U.S. 123, 129-30, 112
S.Ct. 2395, 120 L.Ed.2d 101 (1992); Lakeuadi
v Plain Dealer Puliihmg Ca, 486 U.S. 750, 755-
59, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988);
North A w Nouhsi, Inc v City cfGicag, 88
F.3d 441, 444 (7th Cir.1996). "Challenges to
statutes as written, without inquiring into their
application, are appropriate when details of
implementation are inconsequential (usually
because nothing could be done in the course
of application to save the law) or when the
laws are so overbroad that the risk of
improper application leads persons to
withdraw from the borderland. Fear of
penalty, leading to a reduction in speech,
supports the doctrine that a person whose
speech lawfully could be regulated may
challenge a statute achieving regulation in an
improper way, or to an excessive extent."
Harp A dwnz g Illrims, Ina v Village cf iago
Ridge, 9 F.3d 1290, 1291-92 (7th Cir.1993).
The plaintiffs claim that because a regulation
that requires permission to hold a political
rally in a "public forum" (as the Chicago Park
District's parks are conceded to be) imposes a
"prior restraint" on the exercise of free
speech, it must, to pass constitutional muster,
be free of any element of vagueness or
uncertainty that might enable the regulation to
be enforced in such a way as to deter or
impede the exercise of this most celebrated of
constitutional rights.
We do not find this a helpful formula. The
historical referent of "prior restraints" is
censorship, see 4 William Blackstone,
Conentaris en d Law c England 151-53
(1769), which the administration of a park
system does not much resemble. The
statement in the plaintiffs' brief that "denial of
a permit to hold a rally is the ultimate
censorship" is hollow rhetoric. It is a censor's
business to make a judgment about the
propriety of the content or message of the
proposed expressive activity. Because he is in
the business of suppressing such activity
(friends of free speech are not drawn to a
career in censorship), the danger of abuse is
very great, especially when assessed in light of
the dismal history of censorship. The
regulation challenged here does not authorize
any judgment about the content of any
speeches or other expressive activity--their
dangerousness, offensiveness, immorality, and
so forth. It is not even clear that the
regulation reduces the amount of speech. A
park is a limited space, and to allow
unregulated access to all comers could easily
reduce rather than enlarge the park's utility as
a forum for speech. See CQa v NewHanpsh,,
312 U.S. 569, 574-76, 61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed.
1049 (1941); cf. Beal v Stem, 184 F.3d 117,128-29 (2d Cir.1999). Just imagine two rallies
held at the same time in the same park area
using public- address systems that drowned
out each other's speakers. Cf. Wand v Roe
Agazirt Radsm 491 U.S. 781, 109 S.C. 2746,
105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). The heterogeneity of
the practices that the "prior restraints"
formula covers (with the present case
compare Fmibmn v Mararg 380 U.S. 51, 85
S.Ct. 734, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965), involving a
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movie censorship board) is reason to doubt
that it can provide much assistance to judges
who have to decide a novel case.
The problem is general. General language, the
language in which legal principles are
couched, tends not to help much in the
decision of cases in which weighty interests
are on both sides of the balance that the court
is asked to strike. Thus in this case there is, on
the one hand, a danger in giving officials
broad discretion over which political rallies
shall be permitted to be conducted on public
property, because they will be tempted to
exercise that discretion in favor of their
political friends and against their political
enemies--and the advocates of legalizing the
sale of marijuana and other controlled
substances have very few political friends.
But, on the other hand, a permit requirement
is a sine qua non of managing a park system in
a way that will preserve the value of the parks
for the general public. Parks are primarily for
recreation rather than for political and
ideological agitation. They cannot be
preserved in the primary use for which they
are intended if any group can hold a rally of
any size and length at any time with amplified
sound of any volume. Clak v Ccnrazy for
C=Fatie Nn- Videirz 468 U.S. 288, 296, 104
S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984). Indeed, as
we noted earlier, without regulation even the
agitators might not be able to get their
message across.
The competing interests cannot be weighed in
the abstract in other than the grossest sense,
and so a "correct" balance cannot be struckThis must give pause to any court minded to
strike down a permit regulation on its face and
so without consideration of its application to
a particular event for which a permit wasdenied. A challenge to the wording as distinct
from the application of a regulation invites
semantic nitpicking and judicial usurpation of
the legislative drafting function in an effort to
avert, without creating loopholes, dangers at
best hypothetical and at worst chimerical. The
problem is well illustrated by this case as we
consider the plaintiffs' objections to the
regulation, all of which the district court
rejected en route to granting judgment for the
park district after another panel of this court
reversed the grant of a preliminary injunction.
MacDadld V Ciayzgo Paik Distrit 132 F.3d
355 (7th Cir.1997).
The regulation authorizes the denial of a
permit on a variety of grounds none of which
has anything to do with the content of
expressive activity. Chi. Park Dist.Code ch.
VII § C5(e). One is that the applicant "has on
prior occasions made material
misrepresentations regarding the nature or
scope of any event or activity previously
permitted." The plaintiffs contend that the
word "material" is excessively vague. The
contention is frivolous. The word is one of
the elemental legal terms, and is considered
quite definite enough to form the keystone of
criminal prohibitions against fraud. The
residual vagueness that it shares with most
words could be eliminated only by eliminating
it from the regulation, but that would make
the regulation more rather than less
restrictive. The plaintiffs say that
misrepresentation" is vague too, and would
prefer "falsehood." They have not suggested a
substitute for "material" and so in effect they
want us to rewrite the regulation so that it
authorizes denying a permit to anyone who
has told the park district a fib. All that their
contention regarding the vagueness of
"material misrepresentation" shows is thelimits of language and so the inherent
limitations of "facial" challenges.
They complain that the grounds for denial of
a permit are permissive. The park district
may" deny a permit because of a
misrepresentation, the failure to tender thefee, having damaged property of the park
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district on a previous occasion, or other
grounds listed in the regulation, but it is not
required to; it can forgive. The plaintiffs argue
that this power of mercy arms the park district
to pick and choose among applicants on
political grounds. It indeed creates such a
danger, but if this discretionary feature of the
regulation were excised, the regulation would
be more restrictive than it is (just as it would
be if "falsehood" were substituted for
"material misrepresentation"). This is another
example of how free speech is so often on
both sides of the balance in cases of the
regulation as distinct from the prohibition of
speech, a consideration that should make
courts hesitant to invalidate such regulations.
An even clearer example is a provision of the
ordinance waiving the required permit fee for
events protected by the First Amendment.
The plaintiffs complain that this is vague, but
do not indicate how it could be made less
vague yet encompass the myriad activities that
the First Amendment has been held to
protect. Curtailing speech is an odd way of
protecting speech.
The regulation requires applicants for permits
to obtain liability insurance in the amount of
$1 million to indemnify the park district
against liability arising from a rally that might
degenerate into a riot. (That is the amount of
the policy, not the premium, which for the
type of event envisaged by the plaintiffs
would not exceed $1,200.) The plaintiffs argue
ingeniously that since violence to person or
property incidental to a political rally is likely
to arise from the unpopularity of the cause
espoused by the rally's sponsors or speakers,
the requirement of buying insurance amounts
to a "heckler's veto," which the cases hold is
not a proper basis for restricting free speech.
Frsyh Camry v Natoaulist Moumnt, supra, 505
U.S. at 134-35, 112 S.Ct. 2395; Temnidlo u
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5, 69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed.
1131 (1949); Ca v Lizsiana, 379 U.S. 536,
551-52, 85 S.Ct. 453, 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1965);
Chicgo A om u Metqditan Pier & Excstion
A4tny, 150 F.3d 695, 701 (7th Cir-1998).
But the amount of insurance required is not
based on, or, so far as has been shown,
influenced by, the nature of the event, and
specifically by whether it involves
controversial expressive activity likely to incite
violence by onlookers or opponents. The
required amount and the cost of the insurance
depend only on the size of the event and the
nature of the facilities involved in it (a
bandstand, stage, tents, and so forth).
The park district requires that applications for
permits be filed 30 days in advance--60 days if
special facilities are to be involved, such as
sound amplification, which unless limited can
violate the city's noise ordinance. The
plaintiffs argue that these periods are too long
and inhibit rallies responding to fresh news
and startling events. But since thousands of
permit applications are filed with the park
district every year, it would be burdensome to
require the park to process the applications in
a significantly shorter time. The park district's
policy, moreover, is to allow "spontaneous"
rallies in reaction to current events. The
opportunities for abuse are manifest but are
minimized by the fact that if there is abuse the
victims can bring a judicial challenge to the
permit regulation as applied to them.
The plaintiffs reserve their strongest objection
for the regulation's failure to provide for
searching judicial review of permit denials.
They also complain about the absence of any
deadline for the completion of such judicial
review as the law affords them, not noticing
the tension with their desire that the review be
penetrating and meticulous--which takes time.
In Grf v City f Chicago, 9 F.3d 1309 (7th
Cir.1993) (en banc), the full court confronted
the same issues of the adequacy and timing of
judicial review in the context of an ordinance
regulating newsstands on the city's sidewalks.
The court was badly fractured, but counting
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noses one discovers that a majority believed
that the judicial review procedure was good
enough for a regulation of expressive activity
when the regulation is not a form of
censorship, that is, does not require or permit
the regulatory authority to evaluate the
content or message of the activity regulated.
Id at 1324-25 (plurality opinion), 1330-33
(concurring opinion). This regulation does
not.
Review of agency action in Illinois is governed
by an administrative procedure act (similar to
the federal act, Intemtranwl Cdly ofSupr~m v
Cty cf Chrzgo, 153 F.3d 356, 364 (7th
Cir.1998))--but only if the statute creating the
agency so provides. 735 ILCS 5/3-104. If it
does not so provide, and it does not with
respect to the park district's denial of permit
applications, the agency's action is reviewable
only by means of a proceeding for common
law certiorari. But this turns out to be a
distinction without a difference. The
proceeding is instituted in the same state court
that would review the action under the
administrative procedure act, Snath v
DePairrt qC Public Aid 67 Ill.2d 529, 10
Ill.Dec. 520, 367 N.E.2d 1286, 1293 (1977),
and although the standard of review is stated
in different words from those used in that act,it amounts to the usual substantial-evidence
review that is familiar from administrative law.The reviewing court does not take evidencebut relies on the record compiled in the
administrative proceeding and seeks only todetermine whether the agency's legal
conclusions are correct and the agency'sfactual conclusions supported by substantial
evidence, e.g., Noltn v N ads cn 187Ill.App.3d 1046, 135 Ill.Dec. 485, 543 N.E.2d1053, 1059 (1989), or in other words not
clearly erroneous. The review process is thus
the same as under the state's administrative
procedure act--as indeed the Supreme Court
of Illinois stated in Hanahan v VdlinN, 174
Ill.2d 268, 220 Ill.Dec. 339, 673 N.E.2d 251,
253-54 (1996).
The plaintiffs argue that the park district
should in every case in which it denies a
permit be required to seek judicial review of
its own action. The argument is based on a
misreading of Fnrainn v Marlar supra, 380
U.S. at 58-59, 85 S.Ct. 734, which holds only
that the government may not regulate the
content of speech without judicial
authorization and so does not extend to time,
place, and manner licensing systems. The
Supreme Court made that clear in FW/PBS,
Inc v City f Dallk, 493 U.S. 215, 228- 230,
110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990)
(plurality opinion), ii at 244, 110 S.Ct. 596
(concurring opinion), id at 249, 110 S.Ct. 596
(concurring and dissenting opinion).
But their principal complaint about the
judicial-review procedure we've outlined,
other than the lack of a deadline for the
court's decision, is that there is no provision
for an oral hearing. An applicant denied a
pernnit can appeal the denial to the park
district's superintendent, and submit any
documents he wants, and the district must
give written reasons for its action. But all
submissions are in writing and therefore, the
plaintiffs argue, the record compiled before
the park district is insufficient to enable
meaningful judicial review of the
superintendent's action. The argument isdefeated by the plaintiffs' own emphasis on
the importance of expedition. The regulation
requires the park district to act on a permit
application within 28 days and an appeal fromthe denial of such an application to be decided
by the superintendent within 7 days. Thesedeadlines are too tight to permit an
evidentiary hearing with oral testimony, cross-
examination, and the other accouterments of
a trial. The plaintiffs have to choose between
orality and expedition; they refuse to do so.
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The entire emphasis on judicial review and
evidentiary hearings is misplaced. If a person
denied a permit for reasons that he believes
violate the First Amendment is dissatisfied
with a paper record reviewed in state court by
means of common law certiorari, he has only
to bring a suit in federal district court and if
the matter is urgent to seek as these plaintiffs'
predecessor (the deceased MacDonald) did a
preliminary injunction. See Patsy u Bazni j
Rentr, 457 U.S. 496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73
L.Ed.2d 172 (1982); Van Haken u City I
Ckago, 103 F.3d 1346 (7th Cir.1997);
Hantmn v City f icay, 776 F.2d 636 (7th
Cir.1985). Given that the plaintiffs have two
remedies, one in state court and the other in
federal court, the possible inadequacies of the
state remedy, inadequacies in any event
balanced by the expedition that barring oral
testimony permits, are trivial.
The plaintiffs fear that the required expedition
at the administrative level will be undone by
foot dragging at the state court level, since
there is no deadline on when the state court
must render its decision in a common law
certiorari proceeding. It is of course unusual
though not unknown to impose a time limit
on judges, the fear being that it will both
disrupt the orderly management of a judicial
docket and conduce to hasty decision making.
Since 42 U.S.C § 1983, the statute under
which federal constitutional claims are
litigated in the federal courts, does not impose
any requirement (with immaterial exceptions)
of exhausting state judicial remedies, the
victim of foot dragging in state court can
always bring a parallel suit in federal court,
complaining that the delay is denying him an
adequate remedy for the violation of his
constitutional rights.
Although a number of cases hold that judicial
review of the denial of a permit must indeed
be "deadlined," Baby Tam & Ca v City jLas
Vegas, 154 F.3d 1097, 1101-02 (9th Cir.1998);
11126 Baltinme Blai, Inc v Pnm Gane's
Cany, 58 F.3d 988, 998-1001 (4th Cir.1995)
(en banc); East Bnxs Boks, Inc v City 9
Memphis, 48 F.3d 220, 224-25 (6th Cir.1995);
Radrer v Dean, 29 F.3d 1495, 1501-02 (11th
Cir.1994); contra, City Neus & Nozd. Irx v
City of Waukeha, 231 Wis.2d 93, 604 N.W.2d
870, 881- 82 (1999), cert. granted, --- U.S. ---- ,
120 S.Ct. 2687, 147 L.Ed.2d 960 (2000); 7K's
Vide Inc v Denton Camty, 24 F.3d 705, 707-
09 (5th Cir.1994), they all involve special
licensing regimes for sexually oriented
businesses. They are based on Supreme Court
cases involving censorship, such as the
Fnmmn case cited earlier, or quasi-
censorship, such as the ordinance at issue in
FW/PBS, In v City qt Dallas, supra, which
required the licensing of such businesses. The
government's evident concern with the
content of the "speech" disseminated by such
businesses argues for greater judicial vigilance
than in time, place, and manner cases, in
which our rejection of deadlining in Gnf 9
F.3d at 1324-25, stands uncontradicted. Cf.
Jevi for Jeus, Irc v Massabusetts Bay
Trarspoiation Autxoity, 984 F.2d 1319, 1327
(1st Cir.1993). Realism required recognition of
the danger that state courts might drag their
heels in deciding appeals by sexually oriented
businesses from denials of licenses. The
permit requirement at issue here is far more
general and so far as appears the permits that
are denied do not relate to controversial or
unpopular expression. Especially in the
absence of any showing, which has not been
attempted, that the Chicago Park District is
trying to restrict the expression of unpopular
ideas or that the state courts are not acting
with reasonable promptitude on appeals from
permit denials, a more relaxed attitude toward
the pace of judicial review is warranted than in
the case of regulation targeted at unpopular
expression. Cf. Wand v Rock Aairst Racisr
supra, 491 U.S. at 795, 109 S.Ct. 2746; Stdeer v
City j Madison, 930 F.2d 1163, 1170 (7th
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Cir.1991); MacDad v Safir, 206 F.3d 183,
191 (2d Cir.2000). AFFIRMED.
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Top Court Takes Permit Case
City Parks Denied Bid to Rally for Drug Law Reform
Chicago Tnibune
Wednesday, May 30, 2001
Glen Elsasser
The Supreme Court agreed Tuesday to decide
whether the Chicago Park District's permit
regulations violate the Constitution's free
speech guarantees.
"This case is about the right of citizens to
speak out publicly on issues of political
importance," lawyers told the court on behalf
of a group seeking reform of the nation's drug
laws.
At issue is a September 2000 ruling by the 7"
Circuit Court of Appeals upholding the Park
District regulations on rallies in city parks that
involve more than 50 persons.
The case arose in March 1997 when the Park
District denied a permit requested by Robert
MacDonald, the late activist seeking
decriminalization of marijuana.
MacDonald wanted to hold a political rally in
Grant Park on the subject of drug law reform.
According to the appeal, the Park District said
it denied the application because MacDonald
had failed to comply with the terms of two
previous rally permits in 1996.
Denying any violations, MacDonald charged
in a civil rights suit that the permit ordinance
was an unlawful prior restraint of free speech.
Richard Wilson of Orlando, MacDonald's
counsel, said Tuesday that his clients want the
high court to impose a deadline on Park
District decisions on permit applications.
Other issues to be decided, said Chicago
lawyer Wayne Giampietro, are whether the
Park District is required to have a court
decide the propriety of permit denials and
whether it bears the burden of proof.
In upholding the Park District ordinance, the
federal appeals court in Chicago said, "A park
is a limited space, and to allow unregulated
access to all comers could reduce rather than
enlarge the park's utility as a forum for
speech."
While "advocates of legalizing the sale of
marijuana and other controlled substances
have few political friends," Judge Richard
Posner wrote, the Park District regulation
nevertheless authorizes the denial of a permit
"on a variety of grounds none of which has
anything to do with the content of expressive
activity."
The outcome of the case is expected to affect
another case concerning Chicago's ordinance
regulating parades.
MacDonald challenged the regulation after the
city twice denied his group, the Windy City
Hemp Development Board, permits to march
through the Loop and along Michigan
Avenue.
Giampietro said he planned to file a Supreme
Court appeal on the parade ordinance next
week.
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The court is expected to hear arguments and
issue a decision during its new term, which
begins in October.
Copyright c 2001 Chicago Tribune
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00-799 Los Angeles, Calif. v. Alameda Books, Inc.
Ruling Below (9h Cir., 222 F.3d 719, 28 Medial L. Rep. 2281):
City ordinances prohibiting operation of adult businesses that both sell adult products and
contain facilities for viewing adult movies or videos, which were adopted entirely on basis of
study of secondary impact of adult business concentrations that (i) treated bookstore/arcade
combination as business whose secondary effects arise from proximity to other adult
businesses and (ii) was not directed at determining impact of individual adult entertainment
businesses, were not supported by reasonable belief that bookstore/arcade businesses
produce harmful secondary effects and thus violate the First Amendment.
Question Presented: Is zoning ordinance that prohibits operation of more than one adult
entertainment business at single location, including adult bookstore and adult arcade, invalid
because city did not study negative effects of such combinations of adult businesses, but
rather relied on judicially approved statutory precedent from other jurisdictions?
ALAMEDA BOOKS, INC., et al, Plaintiffs-Appellees
V.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant-Appellant
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Decided July 27, 2000
MICHAEL DALY HAWKINS, Circuit
Judge:
We must determine whether the district
court was correct in concluding as a matter
of law that ordinances of the City of Los
Angeles (the "City" or "Los Angeles")
prohibiting the operation of adult businesses
that both sell adult products and contain
facilities for the viewing of adult movies or
videos were inadequately supported by
evidence of adverse impact so as to violate
the First Amendment. We affirm.
I.
BACKGROUND
On July 28, 1978, the City enacted
Ordinance No. 151,294, adding section
12.70 to the Los Angeles Municipal Code
("LAM "), which prohibits the
"establishment, substantial enlargement or
transfer of ownership or control" of an adult
business establishment "within 1,000 feet of
another such business or within 500 feet of
any religious institution, school or public
park within the City of Los Angeles."
L.A.M.C. § 12.70(C) (1977). The regulation
was enacted after a comprehensive study,
conducted in 1977 and assessing the impact
of concentrations of adult businesses on
surrounding areas, found a positive
correlation between concentrations of adult
businesses and increases in prostitution,
robberies, assaults, and thefts. * * *
290
In 1983, the City amended section 12.70(Q,
with the passage of Ordinance No. 157,538
to prohibit so-called "multiple use" adult
businesses. Section 12.70(Q, as amended,
additionally prohibits "the establishment or
maintenance of more than one adult
entertainment establishment in the same
building, structure, or portion thereof...."
L.A.M.C 5 12.70(C). The 1983 amendments
also modified the existing definition of an
"adult entertainment business" to specifically
categorize inter aiza an "adult bookstore" and
an "adult arcade" as "separate adult
entertainment businesses even if operated in
conjunction with another adult
entertainment business at the same
establishment." L.A.M.C S 12.70(B)(17).
Appellees, Alameda Books, Inc. ("Alameda")
and Highland Books, Inc. ("Highland"), are
two adult businesses operating within the
city limits of Los Angeles. Neither is located
within 1,000 feet of another adult business
nor within 500 feet of any religious
institution, public park, or school. Each
business occupies less than 3,000 square feet.
Both Alameda and Highland rent and sell
sexually oriented products, including
videotapes. Additionally, both businesses
provide booths where patrons can view
videotapes for a fee. The booths are of two
types. In the Preview Booths customers can
view videotapes that are for rent or sale
within the store. The Multi-channel Viewing
Booths allow customers to choose from
dozens of pre-selected videotape selections.
The video booths and the retail sales and
rental of tapes of both stores are located in
the same commercial space within a single
building. There are no distinctions, physical
or otherwise, between the different
operations within each of the stores. Each
has only one entrance door, and one
employee supervises the entire location.
Additionally, the appellees are the sole
owners of each of their stores, and revenue
from the video booths and the sales and
rentals is not distinguished in any way, other
than for internal accounting purposes.
Notwithstanding these facts, it is
uncontested that both businesses have
operations that fall within the definitions of
"adult bookstore" and "adult arcade" under
section 12.70(B)(17) of the L.A.M.C
On March 15, 1995, a City building inspector
found that Alameda was operating both an
adult bookstore and an adult arcade in the
same building and was therefore in violation
of section 12.70(C). Alameda and Highland
then joined as plaintiffs and sued for
declaratory and injunctive relief under 42
U.S.C § 1983 to prevent enforcement of the
ordinance. Both the City and the appellees
filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
The district court initially denied both
motions on the First Amendment issues,
concluding that there was a "genuine issue of
fact as to whether plaintiffs' bookstore and
arcade components were separate
businesses, like those whose concentration
was examined by the 1977 studies." Alameda
and Highland then filed a motion for
reconsideration of the First Amendment
portion of the district court's order denying
summary judgment. On June 2, 1998, the
court vacated its prior order and granted
summary judgment for Alameda and
Highland and issued a permanent injunction
enjoining the enforcement of the ordinance
against the appellees. The City then appealed
to this court. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C 5 1291.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de
rn Se, eg, Rabi v Red 173 F.3d 736, 739
(9th Cir.), act d --- U.S. ----- , 120 S.Ct.
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375, 145 L.Ed.2d 293 (1999). We must
determine, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the appellants, whether
there are any genuine issues of material fact
and whether the district court correctly
applied the substantive law. See eg, Berry u
Valoe, Tah., In, 175 F.3d 699, 703 (9th
Cir.), an dead --- U.S. ----- , 120 S.Ct. 528,
145 L.Ed.2d 409 (1999). We do not weigh
the evidence or determine the truth of the
matter; rather, we only decide whether there
is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Se
Cdaando v City of Kt 163 F.3d 545, 549
(9th Cir.1998).
The constitutionality of a regulation is a
question of law that is reviewed de noza Sw
Gnzalez v Metropditan Tratp. A uth., 174
F.3d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir.1999).
III.
ANALYSIS
A. Renton Analysis
Our inquiry, though not the result, is
somewhat complicated by two varying
formulations of the test governing our
analysis. In Tdlis v San Bernanino Camozy 827
F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.1987), we were presented
with the opportunity to apply the then-
recent decision of the Supreme Court in City
ofRa n v Playin A , Ir, 475 U.S. 41,
106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986), which
analyzed the constitutionality of city zoning
regulations that prohibited adult theaters
from being located within 1,000 feet of any
residential zone, single- or multiple-family
dwelling, church, park, or school. Tdis held
that Renr had established a "three-step
inquiry" to determine the constitutionality of
such ordinances. Tdlis, 827 F.2d at 1332. A
reviewing court must inquire: (1) whether
the ordinance is a time, place, manner
regulation; (2) if so, whether it is content-
neutral or content- based; and (3) if content-
neutral, whether it is "designed to serve a
substantial governmental interest and do[es]
not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of
communication." Id (internal quotations
omitted); see also Renta 475 U.S. at 47, 106
S.Ct. 925.
More recently, we formulated this test in a
slightly different and (we believe) more
coherent manner. In Cdamo v City of at,
163 F.3d 545 (9th Cir.1998), we looked to
the Supreme Court's opinion in Wand v Rok
Aguzt Racin 491 U.S. 781, 109 S.Ct. 2746,
105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989), to determine the
constitutionality of the city's ordinance
requiring nude dancers to perform at least
ten feet from patrons. * * * Citing to Wac
we held that "[m]unicipalities may impose
reasonable restrictions on the time, place or
manner of protected speech, provided the
restrictions are: (1) content- neutral; (2)
narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest; and (3) leave open
ample alternative channels for
communication of the information."
Cdacao, 163 F.3d at 551.
The differences between the Tdlis and
Ciamo test are slight, yet obvious.
Cdaamcio eliminates Tdis 's first step--
determining whether the ordinance is a time,
place or manner regulation--and merely splits
the two inquiries of Tdlis 's third step--
narrow tailoring to serve a significant
government interest and ample alternative
means of communication--into two separate
steps. * * * Clearly, there is no substantive
difference between Tdlis and Cdaari and a
given result under one necessarily dictates an
identical outcome under the other.
Moreover, the jurisprudence governing each
test is fully applicable to both.
Cdaanas however, better formulates the
test. First, the third step of Tdlis
incorporates two distinct inquiries, which are
more properly separated for both conceptual
and practical reasons in Cdaama
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Additionally, Td/is needlessly establishes the
time, place or manner inquiry as a distinct
step. Time, place or manner is an objective
description of a regulation (or one proffered
by the enacting legislative body); it is not a
talismanic incantation affording the
ordinance a lesser degree of judicial scrutiny.
To the contrary, the question the courts
must ask is whether the time, place or
manner regulation is content-neutral. The
Supreme Court recognized as much in Wani
when it excluded a time, place or manner
analysis, which it had included in Renta,
from its discussion. For the sake of clarity
and consistency in future opinions, and
because we believe the Cdaemio formulation
is more aptly constructed, we will utilize it
here.
As a preliminary matter, we note that section
12.70(q comes under the general category
of a time, place, or manner regulation. Renton
held that zoning regulations governing adult
businesses are generally considered time,
place or manner regulations. Se Renta, 475
U.S. at 46, 106 S.Ct. 925. Moreover, section
12.70(Q does not ban adult entertainment
establishments altogether. S& Tdis, 827 F.2d
at 1332 (holding that ordinance before the
court was "obviously" a time, place, or
manner regulation "as it [did] not ban adult
theaters altogether").
Under Cdaanio 's first step (i.e. Td1i 's
second step), a regulation is content-neutral
if the ordinance is "aimed to control
secondary effects resulting from the
protected expression rather than at inhibiting
the protected expression itself." Tdis, 827
F.2d at 1332 (internal quotation omitted)
(citing Renta 475 U.S. at 48-49, 106 S.Ct.
925); see also Rentai 475 U.S. at 48, 106 S.Ct.
925 (regulation is content-neutral if it is
"justified without reference to the content of
the regulated speech"). * * * We need not
decide whether the contested regulation is
content- neutral, for even if it were, it fails to
satisfy the second step in the Cdaamio
analysis (i.e. the third step of Tdlis). * * *
B. Cdaanco 's Second Step: Substantial
Government Interest
The City has a "substantial government
interest" in reducing crime in its
neighborhoods. Se Yag u A nran Mm'i
7earns, 427 U.S. 50, 71, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49
L.Ed.2d 310 (1976) ("[TJhe city's interest in
attempting to preserve the quality of urban
life in one that must be accorded high
respect."). At issue is whether the regulations
are "designed to serve" this interest. We hold
they are not.
The only evidence relied upon by Los
Angeles to justify the 1983 amendments to
section 12.70(Q is the 1977 study (the
"Study"), which was used as the basis for the
enactment of the original regulations. This is
insufficient.
The Study looked at the concentration of
four types of adult businesses: massage
parlors, "bookstores/arcades," theaters, and
adult motels. It assessed five areas where
these businesses were concentrated and
compared crime rates in these areas with
rates in nearby "control" areas. Additionally,
the Study measured changes in assessed land
values from 1970 to 1976 in the study and
control areas. As noted, the Study concluded
that there was a positive correlation between
concentrations of these adult businesses and
increases m prostitution, robberies, assaults,
and thefts.
The district court found that the Study
addressed the secondary impact not of single
adult business establishments, but of
concentrations of separate, individual adultbusinesses, and that appellees' businesses are
not separate in the sense that the businesses
surveyed in the Study were separate
establishments. As the Study was the only
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evidence to justify the 1983 amendments,
the district court held that summary
judgment was appropriate because the City
could not meet its burden to show that it
"relied on evidence supporting a reasonable
belief that combination businesses ...
produced harmful secondary effects of the
type asserted" in the 1977 Study. We agree.
The Study treated a bookstore/arcade
combination as a single business or unit of
adult entertainment whose secondary effects
arise from its proximity to several other units
of adult entertainment. It did not analyze an
individual bookstore/arcade combination as
a concentration of adult businesses.
Additionally, the Study was not directed at
determining the impact of individual adult
entertainment business units. Rather, its
purpose was to ascertain the impact of a
concentration of such business units in small
geographic areas. Therefore, by categorizing
certain businesses as "bookstore/arcades,"
the Study determined not what the impact of
a "bookstore/arcade" was on the
surrounding area, but the impact of a
bookstore/arcade as an individual business
entity that was part of a concentration
consisting of multiple adult business
establishments. As such, the Study did not
identify any harmful secondary effects
resulting from bookstore/arcade
combinations as individual business units.
The City does not argue that the Study
explicitly considered adult arcades and
bookstores as separate business entities, an
argument that would support its contention
that a combination bookstore/arcade as an
individual business entity is a
"concentration" of adult businesses. Nor
does it dispute that the concentration of
adult businesses was the primary cause of the
harmful secondary effects identified in the
Study. Indeed, the pertinent findings of the
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Study focus solely on the concentration of
separate adult business entities. Rather, the
City asserts that the Study provides enough
of a basis to allow it to constitutionally
proscribe combination adult businesses
under section 12.70(Q of L.A.M.C The
City's arguments fail.
In examining the City's regulation of adult
businesses, we are mindful of numerous
admonitions from the Supreme Court about
the proper role of the judiciary in
scrutinizing legislative judgments. In
A neican Mini 7hatns, the Supreme Court
recognized that the courts are not to second-
guess legislative solutions. In upholding the
validity of a zoning regulation prohibiting
adult entertainment establishments within
1,000 feet of one another, the Court stated:
"It is not our function to appraise the
wisdom of [the City Council's] decision....
Moreover, the city must be allowed a
reasonable opportunity to experiment with
solutions to admittedly serious problems."
427 U.S. at 71, 96 S.Ct. 2440; se also Raw;
475 U.S. at 52, 106 S.Ct. 925 (quoting
Anrtnan Mimi 7xats ); Unital State v
Allertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689, 105 S.Ct. 2897,
86 L.Ed.2d 536 (1985) (validity of a content-
neutral time, place, or manner regulation
does not "turn on a judge's agreement with
the responsible decisionmaker concerning
the most appropriate method for promoting
significant government interests"); Jons
Imnal Inc v City of Cbula Vita, 80 F.3d
320, 326 (9th Gr.1996) (courts "accord
substantial deference to the predictive
judgments" of legislative bodies when
analyzing content-neutral regulations that
burden speech) (quoting Twmer Bruad Sys.,
Inc v FCC ("Tmer I), 512 U.S. 622, 665,
114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994)).
This deference to legislative decision making
is not unbounded. In Tal, we established a
predicate evidentiary requirement that must
be met before we will defer to the judgments
of legislative bodies enacting content-
neutral time, place, or manner regulations
that incidentally burden speech. Tatis
considered an injunction against the
enforcement of a county zoning ordinance
prohibiting adult-oriented businesses from
locating within 1,000 feet of various other
establishments (e.g., schools, churches, etc.).
The county had interpreted the ordinance
such that a single showing of an adult movie
would make a theater an "adult-oriented
business" for the purposes of the ordinance.
Sw 827 F.2d at 1331.
In affirming the injunction, we held that
under Re= the county "must show that in
enacting the particular limitations ... it ?iad
upon evidence permitting a reasonable
inference that, absent such limitations, the
adult theaters would have harmful secondary
effects." Id at 1333 (emphasis added). We
then found that the county had presented no
evidence that a single showing of an adult
film would have any of the harmful
secondary effects on the community that the
county had identified as the basis for the
regulation. Id
Like the county in Tdlis , Los Angeles has
presented no evidence that a combination
adult bookstore/arcade produces any of the
harmful secondary effects identified in the
Study. As the above discussion indicates, the
evidence the City has "relied" upon--the
1977 Study--contains no findings that an
individual combination bookstore/arcade
produces any of the increased crime the
Study found resulting from a concentration
of adult businesses. Therefore, it is
unreasonable for the City to infer that absent
its regulations, a bookstore/arcade
combination would have harmful secondary
effects. Se also Acrn Ims., In v City of
Seathe, 887 F.2d 219, 222 (9th Cir.1989)
(holding unconstitutional under Rents a city
licensing fee for specific types of adult
theaters because the City had "failed to
prove" that these theaters were responsible
for fostering the alleged secondary effects--
criminal activity--that were given as
justification for the licensing fee); Tumer
Bnd Sys., Ir v FCC (Turer II), 520 U.S.
180, 211, 117 S.Ct. 1174, 137 L.Ed.2d 369
(1997) (holding that in reviewing content-
neutral regulations burdening speech under
an intermediate scrutiny standard, the
question for the courts "is whether the
legislative conclusion was reasonable and
supported by substantial edee in hd and
fthe kgiItire id] ") (emphasis added).
The City argues that the original intent of
section 12.70(C), adopted pursuant to the
Study, included a ban on more than one
adult business in a building. This argument is
unpersuasive. Whether the prohibition
against combination businesses was intended
to be included in the original ordinance is
largely immaterial to the question of whether
the Study adequately justifies the current
regulations.
Nor could Los Angeles have reasonably
concluded that the expansion of an adult
bookstore to include an adult arcade would
increase the frequency and regularity of
activity for the business and heighten the
probability that such activity would produce
the harmful secondary effects identified in
the Study. Such reasoning would justify the
prohibition of the simple expansion of a
lone adult bookstore in order to
accommodate a larger variety of adult
products (which, ostensibly, would attract
more patrons), and not for the purpose of
installing an arcade. Such a prohibition,
however, is clearly not supported by the
Study.
The Supreme Court, as well as this circuit,
have held that a legislative body may rely on
studies, conducted by other cities and
counties, linking a concentration of adult
businesses to increased crime to justify its
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own regulation of adult businesses. In
Reitor the Court held that the city was
entitled to rely on the experiences of ... other
cities ... in enacting its adult theater zoning
ordinance. The First Amendment does not
require a city, before enacting such an
ordinance, to conduct new studies or
produce evidence independent of that
already generated by other cities, so long as
whatever evidence the city relies upon is
reasonably believed to be relevant to the
problem that the city addresses.
475 U.S. at 51-52, 106 S.Ct. 925; s& also
Cdaantiq 163 F.3d at 551 ("In evaluating the
secondary effects of adult entertainment, the
city is also permitted to rely on experiences
of other jurisdictions.").
Los Angeles relies on this ability to use
foreign studies for the proposition that the
1983 amendments to section 12.70(C are
entitled to similar deference. If foreign
studies can be used to justify the regulation
of adult business, then surely, the City
argues, its regulations, based upon its own
study, are entitled to deference. Again, this
argument misses the mark. That a legislative
body may rely on foreign studies to establish
its interest in a regulation does not relieve
that entity from the obligation of
demonstrating that the study must be "
'reasonably believed to be relevant to the
problem that the city addresses.' " Graanu
163 F.3d at 551 (quoting Renta 475 U.S. at
51-52, 106 S.Ct. 925). As shown, the Study
fails this test. * * *
The City also points to decisions of our sister
circuits in support of its argument that the
Study provides the necessary evidentiary basis
to satisfy Reton 's third prong. The cases
cited, however, are either directly contrary to
established Ninth Circuit precedent, or merely
restate the requirement that a legislative
body's reliance upon the evidence it cites must
be reasonable. Se, eg., Rmar, 475 U.S. at 51-
52, 106 S.Ct. 925.
In ILQ Inusfts, Inc v City <fRodkter, 25
F.3d 1413 (8th Cir.1994), the Eighth Circuit
upheld the constitutionality of an adult
business zoning ordinance, as applied to adult
bookstores, that prohibited on-premises
viewing of adult movies or videotapes. The
court noted that Rochester relied on foreign
studies and held that under Renta
Rochester need not prove that [plaintiffs'
business] would likely have the exact same
adverse effects on its surroundings as the
adult businesses studied by [other cities]. So
long as Ordinance No. 2590 affects only
categories of businesses reasonably believed
to produce at least some of the unwanted
secondary effects, Rochester must be allowed
a reasonable opportunity to experiment with
solutions to admittedly serious problems.
Id at 1418 (internal quotation omitted). While
this application of Rentn may be somewhat
more flexible than the standard we announced
in T1is, Los Angeles's regulations would still
fail under the Eighth Grcuit's analysis. The
Los Angeles Study examined concentrations
of multiple adult business establishments; it
did not study the impact of individual
establishments in any form, whether as
solitary units or as part of the concentration
of businesses. Under the Eighth Circuit's
analysis, then, Los Angeles could not have
reasonably believed, based on the Study, that
an individual adult business could produce
some of the secondary effects resulting from a
concentration of businesses.
In MitoSl v Gmrerstan on A ddt Eeainnmt
Estalishns, 10 F.3d 123 (3rd Cir.1993), the
Third Circuit upheld a Delaware statute
setting closing hours for adult businesses and
prohibiting closed viewing booths. The court
cited to Rentn and held that the state "need
only show that adult entertainment
establishments as a class cause the unwanted
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secondary effects the statute regulates." Id at
138. This statement and the Third Circuit's
citation to R az pertain to whether the
regulation is narrowly tailored, not whether
the evidence produced can reasonably justify
the regulation as serving a substantial
government interest. Narrow tailoring of the
Los Angeles ordinance is a question we need
not address.
Moreover, if the Third Circuit's holding were
applied to the issue before us, we would have
to reject its analysis. Merely requiring that a
legislative body show that adult
establishments as a class cause the secondary
effects the regulation is aimed at preventing
could easily fall far short of our requirement
in Tdlis that a legislative body "must show
that in enacting the particular limitations ... it
rdial upn evidence permitting the reasonable
inference that, absent such limitations, the
adult [businesses] would have harmful
secondary effects." 827 F.2d at 1333
(emphasis added).
Finally, the City cites Han Boe Stos, Inc v
Edinite 612 F.2d 821 (4th Cir.1979), a case
in which the Fourth Circuit examined a state
law almost identical to the Los Angeles
ordinance. Har held constitutional a North
Carolina statute prohibiting two or more
"adult establishments" from occupying a
single building. Adult bookstores and adult
arcades were defined as separate
establishments under the statute.
The Fourth Circuit found that the statute, "on
its face," was a "permissible regulation of the
external costs of adult establishments that is
unrelated to the overall suppression of any
protected materials offered by them for public
consumption." Id at 829. In concluding that
the statute served a substantial government
interest, the court noted that no formal
legislative history existed for the statute, but
held that a legislative determination that the
dispersal of the marketing activities of the
businesses might ameliorate adverse
secondary effects "cannot be thought
unreasonable." Id at 828.
Han was decided before Rentxn therefore,
there may be some doubt that it would
survirW scrutiny under the current Supreme
Court's precedent. We are sure, however, that
the case would not pass muster under our
decisions in Tdlis and Awm In Hart, there
was no evidence from foreign studies to
support the statute. What evidence the court
did cite as being produced by the state--a
report on health conditions inside the video
viewing booths that the bill's sponsor read to
a legislative committee, se id at 828 n. 9--
would not meet Tdlis 's reasonable inference
requirement.
Prohibiting arcades and adult bookstores
from being located in the same building
would not prevent the type of unhealthy
conditions in the booths that the Fourth
Circuit cited as the only evidence produced by
North Carolina to justify its statute. There is
nothing in the case to indicate that the same
type of behavior that occurs in viewing
booths in combination bookstore/arcades
would not occur in an establishment that only
furnishes an arcade. Therefore, any inference
that the statute could have an ameliorating
impact on the identified harmful secondary
effects would be unreasonable under both
Tdis and A rn.
The decision of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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Court Reviews Adult Businesses Law
The Associated Pirss
Monday, March 5,2001
Laurie Asseo
The Supreme Court agreed Monday to
take on a free-speech case and clarify
what evidence of harmful effects cities
must have to justify regulating the
location of adult bookstores and video
arcades.
The court said it will hear Los Angeles'
argument that it provided enough
evidence to warrant upholding an
ordinance that banned adult bookstores
and video arcades from operating at the
same location.
Two adult businesses won a lower court
ruling that barred enforcement of the
law.
"There is no evidence that a combination
adult bookstore/arcade produces any of
the harmful secondary effects" identified
in a city study, the 9th U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals said last August.
Los Angeles enacted an ordinance in
1978 requiring adult establishments to
be at least 1,000 feet away from other
such businesses and 500 feet away from
any school, religious institution or public
park.
The ordinance was based on a 1977
study that said concentrating adult
businesses in a particular area led to
increased crime, lower property values
and other negative effects.
The law was amended in 1983 to
prohibit operating more than one type of
adult business in the same building, even
if they were part of the same
establishment. Adult bookstores and
video arcades were to be considered
separate businesses.
That ordinance was challenged in federal
court by Alameda Books and Highland
Books, which each operated adult
bookstores and adult video arcades in the
same location.
A federal judge ruled for the two
businesses in 1998, and the 9th Circuit
court agreed. Los Angeles has a
"substantial government interest" in
reducing crime in its neighborhoods, but
it did not provide enough evidence that
the restriction would serve that goal, the
appeals court said.
"There is nothing in the case to indicate
that the same type of behavior that
occurs in viewing booths in combination
bookstore/arcades would not occur in an
establishment that only furnishes an
arcade," the court said.
In the appeal granted Supreme Court
review Monday, the city's lawyers said a
1984 Supreme Court ruling "does not
require a city council to independently
investigate or corroborate each potential
problem when it acts in furtherance of
the public interest."
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The bookstores' lawyers said a zoning
law like the Los Angeles ordinance
"would allow the absolute destruction of
any adult bookstore business" by
defining each type of product as a
separate business that could not occur in
the same store.
The case is Los Angeles v. Alameda
Books,00-799.
Copyright c 2001 The Associated Press.
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High Court to Wade Back into Secondary-Effects Debate
Fredomfonum.org
Tuesday, March 6,2001
Tony Mauro
It seemed like d6ji vu yesterday, as the
Supreme Court agreed to consider yet
another adult-entertainment case that will
give it the chance to elaborate on the
"secondary-effects" doctrine, which allows
government to regulate expression
because of the impact it might have on
the surrounding community.
Last year, the court determined in City qc
Ene v Pap' A.M. that officials in the
Pennsylvania town could ban nude
dancing because it promoted alcohol
abuse and domestic violence in the
surrounding neighborhood.
Yesterday, the justices agreed to hear La;
Arghs v A lamda Books, a case testing a
city ordinance prohibiting "multiple-use"
adult establishments on the same
premises.
As part of its effort to disperse adult
businesses and prevent the development
of red-light districts, the city of Los
Angeles in 1978 required that thesebusinesses locate at least 1,000 feet from
each other. In 1983, the ordinance was
refined to also prohibit more than one
adult business from operating on the samepremises.
To support the law, the city relied on a1977 study that showed that the
concentration of adult businessesincreased prostitution and robberies in the
surrounding community.
In 1995, the ordinance was invoked
against Alameda Books and Highland
Books, two companies that operated a
combined adult bookstore and adult
movie arcade that provided individual
viewing booths for patrons. The
companies challenged the ordinance as a
violation of their First Amendment rights.
A federal district court judge and a panel
of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
sided with the companies and struck
down the multiple-use ordinance.
The appeals court ruling, which will be
reviewed by the Supreme Court, asserted
that the city did not provide enough
evidence to justify the multiple-use
ordinance. The 1977 study, the appeals
panel said, "did not identify any harmful
secondary effects resulting frombookstore/arcade combinations as
individual business units ... Los Angeles
has presented no evidence that a
combination adult bookstore/arcade
produces any of the harmful secondary
effects identified in the study." In other
words, the city had not shown that
multiple adult uses on the same premises
- the target of the ordinance 
- had any
special secondary effects that warranted a
separate ordinance banning them.
The city argues that the study wassufficient to justify the ordinance. But the
appeals court, in effect, said that before a
city can regulate adult businesses based ontheir secondary effects, it must providefairly specific evidence that the ordinanceis necessary to accomplish its goal.
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"There is nothing in the case to indicate
that the same type of behavior that occurs
in viewing booths in combination
bookstores/arcades would not occur in an
establishment that only furnishes an
arcade," the appeals panel said.
"Therefore, any inference that the statute
could have an ameliorating impact on the
identified harmful secondary effects
would be unreasonable."
The case could encourage the Supreme
Court to elaborate on how much evidence
of secondary effects a government needs
- and how specific it must be - to
justify severe restrictions on expression
that is protected by the First Amendment.
Free-speech advocates are concerned that
allowing governments to use thin or
tangential evidence to restrict adult
businesses will make it easier for officials
to stifle unpopular speech of all kinds.
The bookstore owners also say that the
Los Angeles ordinance could be misused
to ban all adult establishments by defining
each type of product as a separate
business.
Copyright © 2001 The Freedom Forum.
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